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I. INTRODUCTION

Sixty million Americans live in 300,000 common interest communities
(CICs)-condominiums, planned residential subdivisions, and gated
communities, governed by owners associations.! In a growing number of
CICs, religious symbols and uses are banned from publicly visible areas,

resulting in what this article calls a "religion-free" environment.2 Such
restrictions include prohibitions against religious symbols on doorframes or
* 0 Angela C. Carmella 2010. Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law. I am
grateful to Frank Alexander, Paula Franzese, Leslie Griffin, Paul Hauge, Catherine M.A. Mc Cauliff,
Joseph Singer, Susan Stabile, Robert Tuttle, and Robert Vischer for comments on earlier drafts.
Special thanks go to Laura Caillier, Misha Jacob-Warren, Annmarie Klimowicz, and Jason McLean
for research assistance, and to the Seton Hall University School of Law for support provided by the
summer research grant program.
1. Industry Data, THE CMTY. Ass'NS. INST., http://www.caionline.org/INFO/RESEARCH/
Pages/default.aspx (last visited Sept. 24, 2010); Marilyn Lewis, Delinquent Condo Dues Pressure
Fellow Owners, MSN REAL EST., http://realestate.msn.com/article.aspx?cp-documentid=13107847
(last visited Sept. 24, 2010) (reporting the findings of the Community Associations Institute).
2. See David M. Brown, Fundamental Freedom and Democratic Right: Where Can I Pray?
Sacred Space in a Secular Land, 17 NAT'L J. CONST. L. 121, 147 (2005) (noting, in connection with
the decision of Canada's Supreme Court in Syndicat Northerest v. Amselem, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551
(Can.), that "while 'pet free' condos may be permissible, 'religion free' condos are not").
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against religious objects in front of homes or on balconies, walls or patios.
They also include bans on religious symbols and services in common areas.4
These restrictions produce an excessive privatization of religion, confining
to interior spaces forms of expression and association that are usually public,
and hiding the religious pluralism of the community. This article will argue
that these restrictions violate human dignity, undermine the common good,
and deny the critical role of private property in protecting religious exercise;
as such, they contradict public policy and should not be enforced. Thus, this
article makes a normative argument that, as between models of social life, it
is better to allow the visible expression of religious identity on private
property than to suppress it.
Existing statutory protections for religion do not prevent the
enforcement of most restrictions that lead to religion-free environments.
The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) applies
only to governmental land use controls, not to restrictions imposed by
privately-governed communities like CICs. 5 The Fair Housing Act (FHA)
applies to private as well as state actors and thus offers some protection to
CIC residents.6 Undoubtedly, some important victories have been won in
cases of egregious animus aimed at residents of particular religious
denominations.7 But the "anti-discrimination" statutory model is simply not
sufficient to address the growth of religion-free environments, which are
typically created through religion-neutral restrictions.8 Even facially
discriminatory restrictions against religion, when applied equally to all
faiths, have not been interpreted to fall within the statutory prohibition
against discrimination.9 The change must come through legislation'o or by

3. See infra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
4. See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
5. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2006) (prohibiting substantial burdens, discrimination, and
exclusion in connection with regulation of religious land uses).
6. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (2006) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, national origin, disability, or familial status in the sale or rental of housing and in the
terms and conditions of the sale or rental of housing).
7. See infra notes 198-208 and accompanying text.
8. The Seventh Circuit noted in dictum that application of a neutral rule with disparate impacts
on particular faiths might constitute an FHA violation, but no case has developed such an
interpretation in the CIC context. See Bloch v. Frischholz, 587 F.3d 771, 784 (7th Cir. 2009) (en
banc). See infra notes 199-205 and accompanying text for a discussion of Bloch v. Frischholz.
9. The Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, which enforces the Fair
Housing Act, currently interprets the FHA to prohibit religion-specific restrictions, i.e., to require
equal access for religious and non-religious symbols and uses in common areas. See Religious
Discrimination in Housing, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/crt/religious
discrimination/ffihousing.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2010) ("[I]f people are permitted to put
decorations on their apartment doors, religious individuals should be able to put religious items or
decorations on their doors, such as a Jewish mezuzah or a cross. Similarly, when condominiums or
apartments have a common room that can be reserved by residents for private activities like parties
or book studies, residents seeking to hold a Bible study or other private religious activity may not be
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judicial interpretation of traditional property doctrines."
The phenomenon of the religion-free environment is particularly
disturbing because it challenges the historic connection between religious
exercise and private property and assumes that restraint, rather than freedom,
is the starting point when considering the regulation of religion. This article
is part of a series exploring this connection between religious exercise and
property-particularly by way of the overarching constitutional design that
directs theologically significant symbols and uses to private property1 2 and
concomitantly limits their presence on public property." The series presents

discriminated against."); see also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON ENFORCEMENT OF LAWS
PROTECTING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, FISCAL YEARS 2001-2006, at 17 (2007), available at

http://www.justice.gov/crt/religiousdiscrimination/report/report.pdf.
This is also the interpretation of the FHA given by the Department of Housing and Urban
Development, which handles the administrative enforcement of the FHA. For public housing and
apartment contexts, see Mel Martinez, Sec'y, Hous. & Urban Dev., Remarks at the Faith Based and
Community Initiative Conference (Dec. 12, 2002), available at http://archives.hud.gov/remarks/
martinez/speeches/faithbased02.cfn ("HUD's policy is not to discriminate against people of faith");
Religious Freedom, 6 PHILA. MULTIFAMILY HOUSING HUB NEWS (U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban

Dev., Phila., Pa.), no. 1, Oct. 2006, availableat http://www.hud.gov/local/pa/working/mfiews06oct.pdf
(DOJ and HUD interpret the FHA to mean that tenants in apartments have equal right to use
common areas for Bible study on the same terms as other uses).
In contrast to this proffered interpretation, the only court reviewing an FHA challenge to
such a facially discriminatory restriction on religious use of a CIC common area found the restriction
reasonable and not a violation of the FHA. See Savanna Club Worship Serv., Inc. v. Savanna Club
Homeowners' Ass'n, 456 F. Supp. 2d 1223 (S.D. Fla. 2005) (exclusion of all worship services from
common space was not discriminatory, as all faiths were treated the same). Because religion-only
restrictions on private property have not yet been interpreted by courts to violate the FHA, this
article will consider them permissible.
10. There is precedent at the state and federal level for laws preventing the enforcement of
servitudes that limit expressive rights. Note, for example, that CIC prohibitions on flying American
flags have been rendered unenforceable by the federal Freedom to Display the American Flag Act of
2005 § 3, 4 U.S.C. § 5 (2006) ("[CICs] may not adopt or enforce any policy, or enter into any
agreement, that would restrict or prevent a member of the association from displaying the flag of the
United States on residential property within the association with respect to which such member has a
separate ownership interest or a right to exclusive possession or use."). This provision can be
limited by "any reasonable restriction pertaining to the time, place, or manner of displaying the flag
of the United States necessary to protect a substantial interest" of the CIC. Id. § 4. Several state
counterparts also exist. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 434.5 (West 2009); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
2.042 (West 2010).
11. See infra Part IV.B.
12. The Supreme Court has made clear that "[t]he design of the Constitution is that preservation
and transmission of religious beliefs and worship is a responsibility and a choice committed to the
private sphere, which itself is promisedfreedom to pursue that mission." Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S.
577, 589 (1992) (emphasis added).
13. The references to "public property" throughout this article do not include public property that
is a traditional, designated, or limited public forum. Private religious expression is permitted on the
same terms as nonreligious expression in public forums; such expression retains its private character
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a normative argument in three parts for the protection of responsible
religious exercise by groups and individuals on private and public property.
The first piece focuses on government regulation of religious land use on
private property. 14 That article analyzes RLUIPA, which provides federal
statutory protection to religious exercise as against certain local zoning
efforts.' 5 This article, the second in the series, considers the private
regulation of religious land use on private property through CIC restrictions.
The third article describes limits to governmental involvement in religious
symbolism on public property-limits that are necessary to preserve
important functions of religious associations in civil society.' As in my
previous work, the analysis that lies ahead explores religious freedom in the
context of the common good of society-those conditions which support the
development and flourishing of the human person.' 7 In contrast to my prior
work, however, this article does not focus on the jurisprudence of the
Religion Clauses; it considers instead the role of private law in promoting
religious freedom and the common good within a private property
community and presents a particular normative construction of social life as
it relates to residential property and religion.' 8
For an understanding of religious freedom within a private property
community, and for help in constructing a normative argument, this article
draws on the intellectual tradition of Catholic social thought as it is echoed
in contemporary political philosophy and in constitutional scholarship.' 9
That tradition offers a vision of the human person as being social by nature
(as well as rational, responsible, and bearing dignity) and oriented toward
life in community with others.20 In keeping with this vision, the article
draws upon the Second Vatican Council's Declaration on Religious Freedom

and is protected under the Free Speech Clause as long as the government does not operate the forum
in a way that endorses religion in violation of the Establishment Clause. See Capitol Square Review
& Advisory Bd. v Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995).
14. Angela C. Carmella, RLUIPA: Linking Religion, Land Use, Ownership and the Common
Good, 2 ALB. Gov'T L. REV. 485 (2009).
15. See infra notes 218-220.
16. Angela C. Carmella, Symbolic Religious Expression on Public Property: Implicationsfor the
Integrity ofReligious Associations, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. (forthcoming 2011).
17. See infra notes 76-126 and accompanying text. For prior work involving the common good,
see, for example Angela C. Carmella, Responsible Freedom under the Religion Clauses:
Exemptions, Legal Pluralism,and the Common Good, 110 W. VA. L. REv. 403 (2007) [hereinafter
Carmella, Responsible Freedom]; Carmella, RLUIPA, supra note 14; Angela C. Carmella, A
Catholic View of Law and Justice, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT 255 (Michael

W. McConnell, Robert F. Cochran, Jr. & Angela C. Carmella, eds., 2001) [hereinafter Carmella, A
Catholic View].
18. For a detailed discussion of the importance of normative argument for legal professionals,
see Joseph William Singer, NormativeMethods for Lawyers, 56 UCLA L. REV. 899 (2009).
19. See generally Cannella,Responsible Freedom, supra note 17 at 408-11, 442-47.
20. See generally Carmella,A Catholic View, supra note 17 at 260-65.
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(the Declaration), which calls for religious freedom, not only vis-A-vis the
state, but also in civil society "as far as possible, and curtailed only when
and in so far as necessary."21 Agreeing with other scholars that an
"opportunity for learning and development in [American law] might emerge
from an encounter between [American law] and central elements of the
tradition of Catholic social thought that are manifest in the Declaration,"22
this author finds the document a useful framework for analyzing the private
law concepts presented in the sub-constitutional CIC context. Because the
tradition is not limited to the context of the person versus the state, its
language is neither the "rights talk" nor the "rule-of-law talk" of
constitutional jurisprudence, but rather a communitarian reflection on
responsible religious freedom that is embedded in and accountable to
society. This approach is especially well-suited to the CIC context, which is
characterized by extensive interconnections among residents and their
property interests, and at the same time reaffirms the deeply held assumption
that freedom, not restraint, is the proper starting point for discussions about
religious exercise.
Responsible religious freedom is connected to two large and related
concepts: the common good of civil society and the role of private property
in promoting that good. Catholic social thought, along with political and
jurisprudential theory, recognizes the distinction between the public and
private spheres and the location of vibrant religious life on private property
in civil society. 23 Numerous non-state actors mediate between the person
and the state-families, religious groups, neighborhoods, voluntary
associations, and even market actors-and help create the social conditions
necessary for human flourishing, thereby promoting the common good. The
state coordinates the efforts of these actors "by setting minimum standards

21. Declarationon Religious Freedom, in THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II 675, 687 (Walter M.
Abbott, S.J., ed., 1966) (emphasis added).
22. Gregory Kalscheur, S.J., Moral Limits on Morals Legislation: Lessons for U.S.
ConstitutionalLaw from the Declaration on Religious Freedom, 16 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 6
(2006).
23. See, e.g., PastoralConstitutionon the Church in the Modern World, in THE DOCUMENTS OF
VATICAN 11 199, 280 (Walter M. Abbott, S.J. ed., 1966) ("Ownership and other forms of private
control over material goods contribute to the expression of personality. Moreover, they furnish men
with an occasion for exercising their role in society and in the economy. Hence it is very important
to facilitate the access of both individuals and communities to some control over material goods.
Private ownership or some other kind of dominion over material goods provides everyone with a
wholly necessary area of independence, and should be regarded as an extension of human freedom.
Finally, since it adds incentives for carrying on one's function and duty, it constitutes a kind of
prerequisite for civil liberties." (footnotes omitted)); see also CIVIL SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENT
(Nancy L. Rosenblum & Robert C. Post eds., 2002).
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for economic and social relationships" 24 and intervenes when necessary to
protect the common good.25 Private property helps to preserve the
distinction between the state and civil society and assists non-state actors in
promoting the common good by generating economic and social
development and, most relevant for purposes of this article, by facilitating
the exercise of rights and defining correlative obligations.26
Within this philosophical framework, this article views CICs as
powerful non-state actors in civil society that have the freedom to use
private property to create social conditions for human flourishingconditions like stable and secure neighborhoods. Obviously, in order to
achieve this, CICs must be able to promulgate legally binding restrictions:
security always requires limitations on freedom.27 But CICs have additional
obligations to the common good, such as respecting responsible religious
exercise. When CICs fail to do so, state intervention to limit their
contractual freedom is warranted. The FHA is one such intervention,
designed in part to prevent religious discrimination in access to housing and
the benefits of ownership.2 8 This article contends that additional action is
needed to address the more insidious problem of the religion-free
environment. Thus, while a regulatory framework is essential to residential
life in CICs, the current command-and-control approach to CIC governance
overemphasizes security to the detriment of other fundamental human needs.
In order to enable CICs to promote both security and religious exercisewhich in this author's view are compatible-a new regulatory model, based
on fewer rules and greater cooperation among residents, will be necessary.29
Preventing the spread of religion-free environments and promoting

24. Joseph W. Singer, Things That We Would Like to Take for Granted: Minimum Standardsfor
the Legal Frameworkofa Free and DemocraticSociety, 2 HARv. L. & POL'Y REv. 139, 141 (2008).
25. Carmella, A Catholic View, supra note 17, at 268.
26. See infra notes 128-156 and accompanying text.
27. Singer, Minimum Standards,supranote 24, at 140.
28. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (2006); see also supra note 6.
29. This vision is developed in the CIC literature. See, e.g., Paula A. Franzese & Steven Siegel,
Trust and Community: The Common Interest Community as Metaphor and Paradox,72 Mo. L. REV.
I 11, 1115 n.16 (2007) [hereinafter, Franzese & Siegel, Trust and Community]; Paula A. Franzese,
Does It Take a Village? Privatization,PatternsofRestrictiveness and the Demise ofCommunity, 47
VILL. L. REv. 553 (2002) [hereinafter, Franzese, Village]; Paula A. Franzese, Privatizationand Its
Discontents: Common Interest Communities and the Rise of Government for the "Nice", 37 URB.
LAW. 335 (2005) [hereinafter Franzese, Discontents]. Note that the command-and-control
regulatory approach (and the assertion of rights-based claims) so central to the functioning of
governments is also facing challenges from the "new governance" movement, which substitutes a
model in which the people affected are involved in drawing up the rules. See Jason M. Solomon,
Book Review Essay: Law and Governance in the 21st Century Regulatory State, 86 TEX. L. REV.
819, 822 (2008) (reviewing LAW AND NEw GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US (Grainne de

Burca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006)). Like the CIC reform literature noted, the new governance
movement emphasizes participation of and collaboration among stakeholders in problem-solving and
in devising best practices, and is characterized by flexibility and transparency. See id. at 823.
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responsible religious exercise in CICs requires attention to the expectations
for religious expression that are attached to various property interests. 30 This
approach echoes the Declaration's presumption of freedom (restrained only
when and to the extent necessary). 31 As governing principles, CIC
restrictions on religious symbols or uses (1) should correlate with
expectations commonly associated with particular property rightS32 and (2)
should be enforceable only to eliminate identifiable negative impacts of the
religious exercise, such as interference with neighbors' health and safety,
access to their property, or use and enjoyment of their property.
For instance, with respect to property individually owned (such as a
condominium unit or subdivision lot) or exclusively used (such as a balcony
or patio), a resident is justified in expecting considerable freedom for
religious exercise, subject to regulations to mitigate specific harms to
neighbors. With respect to common property that is available for general
use (such as a meeting room or auditorium), a resident is also justified in
expecting equal access for both religious and non-religious association and
expression. 3 Reasonable time, place, and manner regulations should be
sufficient to ensure fair access to, and prevent the monopolization of and
conflict regarding, common property. The proposal set forth below thus
30. See infra Part III.B.
31. See Declaration,supra note 21, at 687.
32. In a planned residential development, an owner:
[Hiolds title to both the exterior and interior of a residential unit and the plot of land
around it. The [owners association] owns and manages common properties, which may
include streets, parking lots, open spaces, and recreational facilities. In a condominium,
[an owner] holds title to a residential unit (sometimes just the interior of an apartment)
and to a proportional undivided interest in the common spaces of an entire condominium
property. An [owners association] manages the common spaces but does not hold title to
any real property. [Since condominiums usually are not detached homes], an owner of a
condominium unit does not own, in individual fee, the ground under his or her unit, in
contrast to the owner of a home in a planned single-family home development.
Franzese & Siegel, Trust and Community, supra note 29, at 1115 n.16. CIC residents enjoy
nonexclusive easements over common areas and exclusive use rights over common areas
immediately adjacent or otherwise appurtenant to their units, like parking spaces, balconies, and
patios. The owners association "is responsible for maintaining the common areas and the individual
owners are responsible for maintaining their separate interests and any appurtenant exclusive use
common areas." J. Thomas Cairns, Jr., Formation of Common Interest Communities, in LEGAL
ASPECTS OF CONDOMINIUM DEVELOPMENT AND HOMEOWNERS' ASSOCIATIONS IN CALIFORNIA:
FORMATION, CASE LAW, AND DOCUMENT PREPARATION, NAT'L Bus. INST. 15, 22 (2007)

(discussing statutes and practices governing California CICs).
33. This justification is reflected in the interpretation of the FHA held by the DOJ and HUD. See
supra note 9 and accompanying text. Note that in contrast to such commonly available spaces (in
which the concept of equal access makes sense), property dedicated to a specific use, like a pool or
tennis courts, should carry no such expectation of religious (or, for that matter, nonreligious)
association or expression.
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rejects flat prohibitions in favor of tailored controls that protect what are, in
this author's view, the legitimate expectations of neighbors.
Admittedly, CIC residents who want to live in a religion-free
environment are not accommodated under this proposal. Under the terms of
purchase, they may have the general right to expect the absence of visual
clutter or the specific right (beyond aesthetic concerns) to expect the absence
of visible religious symbols and religious uses. They might consider the
public manifestation of religion to be ugly, messy, offensive, divisive,
discomforting, or even threatening. They even might dislike certain faiths or
they might feel strongly that religion belongs inside the home or house of
worship. The normative argument made here, however, does not validate
these expectations; it does not permit the legal enforcement of the rules and
covenants that create the environment they want.
The social life we construct through law requires that we make a
normative choice between a society in which religious identity may be
publicly expressed where one lives, or a society in which it cannot be. In
this author's view, it is better to allow that expression. Residents should
expect that religious exercise be responsible-that is, that it not threaten
health or safety, or interfere with access to, or use and enjoyment of, others'
property or a common element. They should even expect that religious
exercise not involve extreme forms of permanently disruptive expression.
But they should not expect their neighbors to hide their religious identity.
This article proceeds as follows: Part II describes the pervasiveness of
CIC restrictions and the emerging problem of religion-free environments;
Part III explains why servitude regimes that create religion-free
environments are harmful to both the person and society, and develops a
normative approach based on religious, philosophical, and jurisprudential
insights; Part IV argues that reliance on statutory norms of nondiscrimination is insufficient to halt the development of religion-free
environments, that reliance on constitutional norms would actually produce
such environments, and that only the traditional public policy analysis can
prevent the growth of religion-free environments. In the end, the article
rejects the attempt to rely on an anti-discrimination model or to
constitutionalize important rights. Instead, it employs the rule of reason for
the effective protection of those rights, on the theory that CICs correspond
more closely to a model of neighborhood with collaboration and reciprocity
as primary values, 34 rather than to one in which persons assert rights against
a government.

34. See generally Franzese, Village, supra note 29 (discussing the need to recreate social capital
and form authentic communities); Frank S. Alexander, Property and Christian Theology, in
CHRISTIANITY AND LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 205, 214 (John Witte, Jr. & Frank S. Alexander eds.,
2008) (discussing the capacity for other-regarding relationships in CICs).
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II. THE EMERGENCE OF RELIGION-FREE ENVIRONMENTS IN CICS

CICs are widely accepted as the standard for newly constructed housing
in the United States." In the largest metropolitan areas, more than half of
residential sales are within CICs. 6 Further, "[in many rapidly developing
areas, particularly those in the West, nearly all new residential developments
are under the jurisdiction of [property owners associations]. The trend
shows no signs of slowing."3 In fact, zoning regulations often mandate that
new homes be built in CICs, "effectively requir[ing] that all new housing
developments be governed by private associations."
Religion-free environments result from multiple restrictions that are
themselves only a part of a comprehensive web of aesthetic and lifestyle
controls that characterize CICs. 39 The real estate developer that creates the
CIC puts in place this comprehensive regime of "covenants, conditions and
restrictions," and an owners association takes over management
responsibilities and is empowered to enforce, modify, and supplement the
restrictions, as well as collect maintenance fees. 4 0 Any violation of these
restrictions or failure to pay fees can lead to fines, loss of rights to use
common facilities, and even foreclosure to pay the lien resulting from
unpaid fees and fines. 41 Typical covenants specify what colors your house

35. Franzese & Siegel, Trust and Community, supra note 29, at 1111.
36. Id. at 1116-17.
37. Rigel C. Oliveri, Is Acquisition Everything? Protecting the Rights of Occupants Under the
FairHousing Act, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 57 (2008).
38. Lisa J. Chadderdon, No Political Speech Allowed: Common Interest Developments,
Homeowners Associations,and Restrictions on FreeSpeech, 21 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 233, 237,
239-40 (2006).
39. In this article, the concern with "restrictions" is to be understood in its broadest sense. The
critique is aimed at all CIC restrictions, those that exist at the creation of the CIC and those later
enacted. These include (1) covenants that are part of the declaration or governing documents, and
considered deed restrictions, which are typically put in place by the developer (although they can be
later amended by a supermajority of owners) and (2) rules that are later promulgated by the owners
association, made under its rulemaking powers or made by a majority vote of owners. Any reference
to restrictions, covenants, servitudes, prohibitions, and the like shall be understood to include
restrictions made at any time in the life of the CIC, that is, rules, as well as deed restrictions and
amendments. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 6.7 cmt. b (2000); see also infra
note 226.
40. Franzese & Siegel, Trust and Community, supra note 29, at 1117. Owners associations
derive their authority over residents from "covenants, conditions and restrictions" (CC&Rs) set out
in a declaration and attached to all deeds of individually owned residences. Id. They have
rulemaking authority by which they can promulgate rules relating to a host of topics, for example
home occupancy, gatherings in streets and open areas, among other things, and establish a process to
review proposed alterations. Id. at 1118.
41. Id.at I1l8.
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and window treatments can be, how many vehicles you can park in your
driveway, whether you can have a pet, or the number and size of signs you
can place in your window or on your lawn. Common area rules govern the
use of common rooms, auditoriums, pools, and tennis courts. While it is
obvious that prohibitions and rules are necessary for the operation and
maintenance of the community, residents of CICs are often subject to
numerous detailed controls, usually found in a declaration several inches
thick, affecting multiple aspects of residential life.42 Many of these have
become standardized and widely used throughout the nation. Some controls
can border on the absurd, like prohibitions on cracked flowerpots or
overweight pets.43 But even prohibitions that are reasonable, when
considered on an individual basis, can in the aggregate create an oppressive
servitude regime.4
Courts routinely accept the argument that an extensive web of
restrictions is necessary to keep social and aesthetic order and to maintain
property values in the CIC.4 5 As the New Jersey Supreme Court has said,
"[tihe mutual benefit and reciprocal nature of those rules and regulations,
and their enforcement, is essential to the fundamental nature of the
communal living arrangement that [CIC] residents enjoy."4 Because a
purchaser of a residence in a CIC becomes a member of the owners
association and accepts the servitude regime and association governance,

42. Id. at 1125.
43. Id. at 1129-34; see also Franzese, Discontents,supra note 29, at 342-43.
44. See generally Franzese, Discontents, supra note 29. Critics refer to a "'command-andcontrol' rule regime that attempts to regulate all manner of land use and behavior. The legal
straightjacket of rules, in many cases, has led to confusion, misunderstanding, inefficiency and the
abridgment in some instances of the personal autonomy of CIC homeowners." Franzese & Siegel,
Trust and Community, supra note 29, at 1111-12. Another commentator noted:
As the Restatement of Property: Servitudes observes, "[t]hrough their control of
maintenance and assessment levels, rulemaking powers, and enforcement efforts,
community associations often have substantial power to affect both the quality of life and
financial health oftheir members." [Owners associations] can exercise detailed and rigid
controls over their residents, limiting their use of common areas, regulating the interiors
of their units, and even dictating their behaviors. Board members are advised to be
aggressive and inflexible in their enforcement of CC&Rs because any leniency could be
construed as a waiver and any relaxation of standards could reduce the property values of
everyone who lives there. Most boards have the right to enter individual property if
deemed appropriate and necessary.
Oliveri, supra note 37, at 53-54.
45. See generally Stewart E. Sterk, Minority Protection in Residential Private Governments, 77
B.U. L. REv. 273 (1997).
46. Comm. for a Better Twin Rivers v. Twin Rivers Homeowners' Ass'n, 929 A.2d 1060, 1073
(N.J. 2007); accordHidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Norman, 309 So. 2d 180, 181-82 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1975) ("To promote the health, happiness, and peace of mind of the majority of the unit owners
since they are living in such close proximity and using facilities in common, each unit owner must
give up a certain degree of freedom of choice which he might otherwise enjoy in separate, privately
owned property.").
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courts find that residents are on constructive notice of restrictions and
therefore impliedly consent to them upon purchase.47 While critics have
raised important questions regarding the take-it-or-leave-it nature of this
approach-something akin to contracts of adhesion-courts tend to ignore
these concerns. 4 8 Additionally, critics have asked whether the commandand-control model of pervasive regulation fosters authentic community and
neighborliness, or whether it fosters instead the suspicious monitoring of
one's neighbors and overzealous enforcement of rules. 4 9 Despite these
concerns, the only alternative given to the resident who cannot bear the
restrictive climate is clear: do not live in a CIC.50
CIC restrictions on religious symbols and uses can take one of two
forms: generally applicable, religion-neutral restrictions (such as a general
rule against storage of items on the balcony) or restrictions targeted only at
religious conduct (such as a ban on religious services in the common room).
The first kind can impede publicly visible religious exercise as effectively as
the second. 5' Indeed, whether a restriction generally prohibits all lawn

47. Conditions, covenants, and restrictions are treated as covenants that run with the land. See
Franzese, Discontents,supra note 29, at 336.
48. See Franzese & Siegel, Trust and Community, supra note 29, at 1112-15, 1125 (the notion
that the CIC model simply reflects consumer demand "for privatized communities that incorporate a
tightly controlled regime of rules aimed at maintaining and enhancing property values," id. at 1112,
fails to take into account the fact that many factors conspire to diminish the reality of choice in the
housing market). Further, constructive notice of servitudes set out in the declaration is not the same
thing as knowing the implications of every covenant, or the exact range of conduct that will be
governed by the owners association, or the zealous enforcement efforts of some owner associations.
See John C. Kuzenski, Making Room at the Table: The Public Policy Dangers of Over-Reliance on
Black-Letter Contract Terms in State Common Interest Community Law, 7 APPALACHIAN J.L. 35, 53
(2007).
49. See generally Franzese, Discontents, supra note 29, at 347-48; see also supra note 29 for a
discussion on new governance.
50. Commentators have argued that, to do otherwise, to protect individual dissenters from CIC
restrictions, "would result in organizational paralysis. Instead, analysis suggests-and case law
generally supports-protection against redistribution of market value, but not against other harms
suffered by unit owners." Sterk, supra note 45, at 276. As to the suggestion that dissenters try to
change the rule by amendment, this is impracticable. See Franzese & Siegel, Trust and Community,
supra note 29, at 1114. In response to the suggestion that the Orthodox Jewish residents, who could
not build temporary structures on their condominium balconies during a religious holiday due to
aesthetic restrictions, simply buy property elsewhere, the Canadian Supreme Court wrote, "[i]t
would be both insensitive and morally repugnant to intimate that the appellants simply move
elsewhere if they took issue with a clause restricting their rights to freedom of religion." Brown,
supranote 2, at 147.
51. Instead of a flat prohibition, the controls might require that the person or group obtain
advance approval from the owners association. As noted in the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:
SERVITUDES § 6.9 (2000), design controls of varying degrees of specificity and discretion are
pervasive in CICs and "have given rise to substantial amounts of litigation." Courts require that
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ornaments or excludes only religious ones, religious objects are banned in
either case. Regardless of the restriction's form, aesthetic controls on signs,
symbols, decorations, statuary, or items of any kind, together with social
controls on assembly, are capable of producing a religion-free environment.
These restrictions affect religious exercise on three different kinds of
property found in the CIC: property owned by the resident, common
property to which the resident has an exclusive claim, and common property
to which all residents have access. The first type, prohibitions on
individually owned property, usually occurs in planned developments where
the resident owns her home and the land under it. 5 2 Consider, for example,

these controls be exercised reasonably. Id. § 6.9 cmts. c & d.
52. Restrictions on individually owned property:
Hindu symbol on driveway: See Annie Gowen, Driveway Painting Tests Religious Freedom;
Loudoun Man Fined $900for Hindu Art, WASH. POST, Dec. 8, 2008, at B I (Hindu religious symbol
painted on driveway; resident ordered to paint over it even though neighbors did not object); see also
Charles Haynes, Understand Each Other, MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, Jan. 10, 2009, available at
2009 WLNR 20122016.
Hindu trellis in front of home: See Julie Kay, Trellis Gets Reluctant OK; Group May Sue, MIAMI
HERALD, June 18, 1999, at IB, available at 1999 WLNR 3378387 (variance received from city, but
homeowners association may sue to have trellis removed; family claims "Hindu law requires certain
areas of the house to be covered to protect occupants' health . . . ."); see also Julie Kay, Faith,Rules
Collide in Hollywood, MIAMI HERALD, June 2, 1999, at lB, available at 1999 WLNR 3379669
(association said Hindu family could build trellis in the back of their home, but family claims it must
be placed in a specific location).
Creche on front lawn: See Editorial, Neighborhood Associations Shouldn't Censor Christmas; Let
Homes Display Religious Expression Without Threats, DETROIT NEWS, Dec. 3, 2005, available at
2005 WLNR 26932859 (owners association orders removal of creche, but not of secular Christmas
decorations); Novi Sub Backs Off, Baby Jesus Stays Put, DETROIT NEWS, Nov. 30, 2005, at Al,
available at 2005 WLNR 26929665.
Peace sign inside a Christmas wreath: See Susan Paynter, Commentary, Images ofSeason Evoke as
Many Jeers as Cheers, CONTRA COSTA TIMES (Walnut Creek, Cal.), Dec. 10, 2006, at F4, available
at 2006 WLNR 21308569 (homeowners association rescinds $1,000-a-day fine) (reported as
S25/day fine in Editorial, Peace on Earth, but Not the Subdivision, DENVER POST, Nov. 28, 2006, at
B6, availableat 2006 WLNR 20585004).
Religious statues: See Statue Pits Family Against Homeowners Association, DETROIT FREE PRESS,
Mar. 19, 2009, at Bl, available at 2009 WLNR 18438236 (Virgin Mary statue in front yard for five
years; association requiring owner to ask for permission to display it based on neighbor complaint);
Editorial, Compromise Needed in Canton Dispute, DETROIT NEWS, July 27, 2001, at IOA (statue of
Mary on front lawn; neighbor seeking removal by association); Florida Homeowners Association
Engages in Religious Discrimination: Bans Virgin Mary Statue, Allows Others-Lawsuit Ensues,
THOMAS MORE L. CTR. (Feb. 17, 2004), http://www.thomasmore.org/qry/page.taffid=19&
(couple ordered to
function=detail&sbtblct.uidl=79&_nc=d9112b5542355e6651f4d625c6b09d85
remove 3-foot tall statue of Virgin Mary from front of their home).
Lights: See Ryan Poliakoff, Decking the Halls? Maybe Not in a Condo, Co-op or HOA, TOLEDO
LEGAL NEWS, Dec. 11, 2009, available at http://www.toledolegalnews.com/articles/index/id/5883
(noting that in 2008 a Southwest Florida homeowners association interpreted rules against signage to
ban "all holiday lights and decorations, much to the distress of the mostly unaware residents").
Message on exterior of home: See Michigan Appeals Panel Blesses Religious Message on Couple's
House, FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER, (Nov. 27, 2003), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/news.
aspx?id=12271 ("Jesus is King" arranged in stone on home's three story turret).

68

[Vol. 38: 57, 2010]

Religion-FreeEnvironments
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

the homeowners association that orders a Hindu family in the subdivision to
remove the jhandi (a religious flag) from the front of their home because it
violates the CIC's ban on religious symbols in front yards. The second
type, restrictions on exclusive use property, is more likely to occur in
condominiums where balconies and patios are owned in common but used
exclusively by the owner of the adjacent residence.54 To illustrate, consider

53. Scott McCabe, Hindu Flags Fly Against Dictates of Home Group, PALM BEACH POST, Jan.
15, 2004, at 5B, available at 2004 WLNR 3028096; see also Leila Persaud Wins Right to Fly the
Flag, INDIA ABROAD (New York), Feb. 13, 2004, at A12, available at 2004 WLNR 15144503
(homeowners association says she can fly flag in front of her house as long as it is not visible from
the front of her house; suggests that she grow plants to hide the flag from public view). The year
before, the owners association voted "to ban religious symbols from all 377 of the community's
front yards," except during a few weeks around holidays like Christmas. Sam Tranum, Board
Disallows Hindu Symbols Neighborhood Bans Religious Displays Outside, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL at
IA, Jan. 15, 2004, availableat 2004 WLNR 20063408; see also Howard Goodman, Commentary,
Boca Might be Good Home for Tolerance Museum, S. FLA. SUN-SENTNEL, Feb. 12, 2004, at IB,
available at 2004 WLNR 20052839.
54. Mezuzah on door post: Many conflicts involve a mezuzah on the exterior door frame. A
mezuzah is a small marker, about three-to-six inches long which contains a small piece of rolled up
parchment of biblical verses; posting is required by Jewish law.
Illinois: See infra notes 199-204 and accompanying text for a discussion of Bloch v. Frischholz, 533
F.3d 562 (7th Cir. 2008), vacated by, Bloch v. Frischholz, 587 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 2009) (en banc);
see also Chicago ordinance and Illinois statute, infra note 205.
New York: See Cuomo Resolves Religious Discrimination Complaint Against Homeowners
Association in Suffolk County, OFF. ATT'Y GEN. (Nov. 2, 2009), http://www.oag.state.ny.us/media
center/2009/nov/nov2a_09.html (Jewish residents who affixed mezuzah to their door were ordered to
either remove or purchase a screen door costing between $300-500 to conceal the object while
residents with other objects, like wreaths, were not asked to remove them; owners association will
issue new rules permitting residents to display religious objects on their properties); see also Bart
Jones, Condo Complex Relents, Agrees to Allow Mezuzahs, NEWSDAY (USA), Oct. 31, 2009, at A05,
availableat 2009 WLNR 21725446.
Florida: Joe Kollin, Condo Bans Religious Symbol on Doorposts, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Feb. 3,
2007, at 1B, available at 2007 WLNR 2108877; Joe Kollin, Human Rights BoardRules for Jewish
Woman: Panel Says Condo Wrong to Order Mezuzah Removed, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, April 24,
2008, at IB, available at 2008 WLNR 7592268 (Broward County Human Rights Board found
reasonable cause to believe board discriminated against Jewish woman, as other religious symbols
were allowed, raising possible fair housing violation); see also Attorney General McCollum Hosts
Roundtable Discussion on 2007 Accomplishments, U.S. STATE NEWS, Dec. 19, 2007, available at
2007 WLNR 25082987 (noting Florida attorney general's involvement in the case). Florida's
condominium statute was amended after this and the Illinois incident in Bloch. See infra note 205.
Connecticut: See Gabrielle Birkner, Couple Wins Fight With Condo Group Over Mezuzah, ADVOC.
(Stamford, Conn.), Aug. 26, 2003, at A13, available at 2003 WLNR 16771712 (Connecticut
Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities drew up a settlement; mezuzah allowed, $4,000
damages paid to couple).
Texas: See Corrie MacLaggan, Lawmakers Seek to Prevent Homeowners' Associations from
Banning Mezuzahs, AM. STATESMAN (Austin, TX), May 6, 2009, available at
see
http://www.statesman.com/news/content/region/legislature/stories/05/06/0506mezuzah.html;
also Douglas Wertheimer, Illinois, then Florida-isTexas Next?, CHI. JEWISH STAR, Apr. 3, 2009, at
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the condominium association that orders Orthodox Jewish families to
remove "succahs" (small shelters or booths with sides but no roof used for
celebrating the nine day Festival of Tabernacles, or Succoth) from their
balconies because they constitute prohibited alteration." And the third type,
1, availableat 2009 WLNR 7194045 (Texas couple ordered to remove mezuzah and fined $25/week
for non-compliance; lost FHA claim before U.S. Dist. Ct., S.D. Tex., Judge Lynn Hughes; they
pursue legislative relief).
Religious statues: See Richard Siegler, Religious Freedom Challenges: What Prohibitions and
When?, 226 N.Y. L.J 3(2001) (discussing Vacca v. Bd. of Managers of Primrose Lane Condo., 676
N.Y.S.2d 188 (App. Div. 1998) where board of managers prohibited statues of Mary and St. Jude in
the soil against the outside wall of the building, immediately adjacent to the unit).
Creche in front yard (exclusive use area): See Jim Woods, Condominium Tells Resident to Take
Down Nativity Display, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Ohio), Dec. 22, 2007, at 03B, available at 2007
WLNR 25294282 (resident disputes area is common space); see also Kristen Alloway, Condos and
Her Creche Don't Mix in Montville: Resident Orderedto Remove Statues, STAR-LEDGER (Newark,
N.J.), Dec. 15, 1998, at 48, available at 1998 WLNR 6959084 (figures were in small yard in front of
her townhouse; condominium manager explained rule was for purpose of "uniformity and control
over the common areas .... They want to control what is shared by everybody so no one person
takes a common area and puts up something that might be offensive to others.").
Jhandi on balcony: See Boodram v. Md. Farms Condo., No. 93-1320, 1994 WL 31025 (4th Cir. Feb.
1, 1994) (general restriction against items on balcony did not violate FHA; religious flags could have
been placed there as long as they were not visible).
Cross on patio: See Thao Hua, O.C. Homeowner's Cross Brought to Bear; Religion: Condo
Association Claims ChristianSymbol is Against the Rules and Could Be Offensive, L.A. TtMES, Jan.
28, 1998, at 1, available at 1998 WLNR 6357442 (Superior Court judge refused to enforce general
ban on patio objects to require resident to remove five-foot tall wooden cross, dismissing the claim
that the cross might be offensive).
55. Succah on Balcony: See Siegler, supra note 54, at 3 (discussing Greenberg v. Bd. of
Managers of Parkridge Condo., N.Y. L.J., Sept. 19, 2000, at 31 (Sup. Ct. Queens County), aff'd, 742
N.Y.S.2d 560 (App. Div. 2002)); see also Scott E. Mollen, Realty Law Digest, 224 N.Y. L.J. 5
(2000); Andy Thibault, Our Condos, Our Town, CoNN. L. TRIB., Jan. 27, 2003, available at 2003
WLNR 18278874 (condominium association specifically banning succahs and menorahs and other
religious symbols after a rabbi celebrated holidays in public view); Residents Upset After Condo
Association Dismantles Sukkah, Vos Iz NEIAS? (Oct. 6, 2009, 10:33 AM), http://www.
vosizneias.com/39434/2009/10/06/bal-harbor-fl-residents-upset-after-condo-association-dimantlessukkah/ ("The attorney for the owners association wrote in a statement: 'The board of directors is
enforcing their documents prohibiting owners from making temporary alterations to the common
element. It's Tantamount [sic] to a Christian making an alter [sic] by the pool during Lent. To
allow one owner to do this we will have to allow 451 owners to do this."'); Jewish Family Finedfor
Sukkot Tent, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1999, at B18, available at 1999 WLNR 3080440; Couple Settle
Religion Discrimination Casefor $27,500, NAT'L FAIR HOUS. ADVOC. ONLINE (Nov. 8, 2005), http://
(succah on condominium
www.fairhousing.com/index.cfm?method-page.display&pageid=3645
unit's patio will no longer be treated as an outside decoration in violation of restrictions); Brown,
supra note 2, at 126-47 (describing Canadian Supreme Court decision in Syndicat Northcrest v.
Amselem, (2004) 2 S.C.R. 551 (Can.) requiring condominium association to allow succah on
balconies for the nine day holiday because the intrusion on neighbors' rights were "minimal," and
rejecting the concern that such a use would lower value or affect aesthetics). For a discussion of an
owners association permitting religious display in contravention of rules, see Tower Forty-One
Ass'n v. Levitt, 426 So. 2d 1290 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (affirming trial court's grant of injunction
against condominium association that permitted the religious display of a succah booth; the bylaws
provided for no religious use, and no religious display in or on a common element).
Succah on patio: See Richard Higgins, Court Saves Holiday, Bos. GLOBE, Oct. 9, 1990, at 17,
available at 1990 WLNR 1620858 (county court grants restraining order against condominium
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restrictions on common property (owned or managed by the CIC)56 that is
generally available to residents for meetings and recreation, occur in both
planned subdivisions and condominiums." In two litigated cases, after a

association enforcement of "no construction" bylaw; an Orthodox Jew is allowed to build and
maintain sukkah during the holiday).
Succah on lawn outside condominium: See Mona Z. Browne, Rules Beat Tradition in Rabbi-Condo
Split Officials Say His Sukkah Violates Building Rules, MIAMI HERALD 7, Sept. 27, 1985, at 7,
available at 1985 WLNR 279323.
56. Common property is owned in a planned development and managed on behalf of common
owners in a condominium. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
57. Common area religious uses:
See Howard Friedman, Suit Challenges Mobile Home Park's Prayer Ban, RELIGION CLAUSE (Apr.
http://religionclause.blogspot.com/2006/04/suit-challenges-mobile-home-parks.html
20,
2006),
(reporting a lawsuit filed by the United States Justice Foundation seeking to force a California
mobile home park to allow religious activity in its common areas); see also Editorial, AG Answers
Group's Prayers, E. VALLEY TRIB., (Apr. 21, 2006, 11:00 PM), http://www.eastvalleytribune.com/
article_49b2a7bb-7cOb-508a-9391-c98aed45b915.html (Arizona Attorney General settles state FHA
suit brought by Mormons regarding access to meeting rooms; association banned all religious groups
use of meeting rooms when group objected to a new fee requirement after using the room once each
week for twelve years); Press Release, Off. Att'y Gen. Terry Goddard, Terry Goddard Settles
available at
2006),
(Apr. 19,
Homeowners Association
with
Mesa
Lawsuit
For a case holding
http://www.azag.gov/pressjreleases/april/2006/SunlandVillageSettlement.pdf.
that a CIC rule banning religious use of common areas did not unreasonably restrict condominium
owners, see Neuman v. Grandview at Emerald Hills, Inc., 861 So. 2d 494 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003);
Noaki Schwartz, A Community Divided, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Jan. 18, 2002, at IB, available at
2002 WLNR 12735403 ("[A]ging Orthodox residents who could no longer walk to services wanted
to worship in their condominium auditorium," but residents voted to ban religious uses); Orthodox
Jews Sue Condo Over PrayerBan, ORLANDO SENTINEL, May 7, 2001, at B3, available at 2001
WLNR 10889705 (Forty Orthodox families held Sabbath prayer service, but after three weeks board
voted to ban only religious uses. Most of other residents and entire board are Jewish). For another
vote to ban religious uses in common areas, see Savanna Club Worship Service, Inc. v. Savanna
Club Homeowners' Ass'n 456 F. Supp. 2d 1223 (S.D. Fla. 2005) (100 residents of 1,550-home
subdivision worshipped at non-denominational service an hour each Sunday morning since 2001);
Lindsay Jones, Worshipers Complain to U.S. About Savanna Club Board, PALM BEACH POST, Aug.
3, 2004 at 1B, available at WLNR 3031357. But see Elaine Matsushita, Synagogue Makes Itself
Right at Home, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 30, 1989, available at 1989 WLNR 1451373 (synagogue
provided within the condominium to accommodate the building's 90% Orthodox Jewish population).
Common area religious symbols:
See Daveen Rae Kurutz, Associations' Rules Can Really Hit Home, PITTSBURGH TRIB. REV., Jan.
18, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 1008227 (condominium banned all Christmas and Chanukah
decorations in common areas, and required use of snowman decorations instead); 2006 Christmas
Watch, CATHOLIC LEAGUE FOR RELIGIOUS AND CIVIL RIGHTS, http://www.catholicleague.org/

linked%20docs/christmaswatch.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2010) (religious symbols banned from
common areas of senior citizen home, reverses policy after lawsuit brought); Sarah Myrick,
CascadesNo Longer Without Baby Jesus, FORT PIERCE TRIB. (Fla.), Dec. 14, 2005, at Al, available
at 2005 WLNR 20237746; Sarah Myrick, Nativity Scene Finds Stable at Cascades, STUART NEWS
(Fla.), Dec. 7, 2005, at Al, available at 2005 WLNR 19697783 (noting that homeowner association
refused to allow nativity scene next to lighted menorah and Christmas tree in clubhouse, then
reversed itself); Letters to Editor, Holiday Displays Best Reserved for Private Property, ST.

71

religious group used the common room for a weekly religious service, some
residents voiced concern that the service was both disruptive and an
impediment to others' use of the space." Rather than enact rules to prevent
abuses by any group and to ensure fair access for all, the owners association
held an election, and the majority voted to ban all religious services from the
common room.59
What is the legal status of these various types of CIC restrictions? We
know that restrictions relating to real property may be unenforceable on
constitutional, statutory, or common law grounds, consent notwithstanding.60
Despite their "private" nature, for instance, racially restrictive covenants
violate the Equal Protection Clause and are thus invalid, on the theory that
judicial enforcement constitutes state action.6' Even without any finding of
state action, legislation can directly render servitudes unenforceable.62
Further, covenants that violate public policy are invalid under the common
law.
Yet, in the CIC context, courts tend to bind residents to the
restrictions. Rights restricted by the servitude regime are generally
considered waived by the act of purchase. 4 Even for courts willing to

PETERSBURG TIMES (Fla. ), Dec. 24, 2001, at 9A, available at 2001 WL 11039946 ("private" refers
to the individual, not to common property); Mark Pearlstein, No Holiday Board Hews to a
Restrictive Stance Toward Religious Decorations, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 20, 1998, at 4, available at 1998
WLNR 6564991 (a question-and-answer with a subscriber concerning the topic of holiday-season
religious display); Kevin Krause, Condo Says No Menorah: Jewish Residents Want their
Decorations, Too, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Dec. 14, 1996, at IB, availableat 1996 WLNR 5452040
(display of menorah not allowed, but Christmas tree permitted because it was deemed commercial);
Norv Roggen, North Palm Man May File Lawsuit over Menorah Flap,PALM BEACH POST, Dec. 19,
1990, at IIB, available at 1990 WLNR 1127209 (resident who put menorah on common property
ordered to remove it).
58. Neuman, 861 So. 2d 494; Savanna Club, 456 F. Supp. 2d 1223.
59. Neuman, 861 So. 2d at 496; Savanna Club, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 1225.
60. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.1 (2000) (validity of
servitudes).
61. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding that judicial enforcement of a racially
restrictive covenant constituted state action in violation of the 14th Amendment). Pressure to
expand the state action doctrine waned because claims of this sort became actionable under the
federal Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (2006), enacted in 1968, which prohibited
discrimination by private as well as state actors in the sale and rental of housing.
62. The Fair Housing Act prohibits not only covenants that discriminate on the basis of race, but
also those that discriminate on the basis of religion, national origin, sex, handicap, and familial
status. See supranotes 6, 9 and infra Part IV.
63. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES

§

3.1 (2000).

For further

discussion, see infra notes 227-242 and accompanying text.
64. See Sterk, supra note 45 at 293. "If... she chooses to purchase in a community that restricts
religious practice ... she might be treated as waiving any constitutional protections she might
otherwise have had." Id. at 293 n.80. For criticism of the "waiver" concept, see Kuzenski, supra
note 48 at 51-56; Note, The Rule ofLaw in ResidentialAssociations, 99 HARv. L. REv. 472 (1985)
and Brown, supra note 2, at 147 (because the condominium restriction was not negotiable, one judge
found that "a right holder who has no other choice but to renounce a right-i.e., no opportunity to
negotiate a contractual provision-cannot be said to have truly waived his or her right").
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protect rights within CICs, the consent-based nature of the CIC, together
with the perceived necessity of extensive restrictions to ensure order and
protect property values, continues to be a formidable obstacle to judicial
intervention. 5
Few reported decisions address CIC restrictions on religion. In the
successful challenges to enforcement of such restrictions, residents prevailed
either because (1) the governing documents did not provide for the
restriction in the first place 66 or (2) the facts demonstrated egregious
religious discrimination proscribed by the FHA.67 Indeed, discrimination
against a particular religious group seems to be a controlling factor, whether
the resident is prohibited by the enforcement of a general restriction or of a
religion-only restriction. 8 So, in the examples above, unless the Hindu
65. See Comm. for a Better Twin Rivers v. Twin Rivers Homeowners' Ass'n, 929 A.2d 1060,
1072-74 (N.J. 2007).
66. See, e.g., Michigan Appeals Panel Blesses Religious Message on Couple's House,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 27, 2003, available at http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/news.aspx?id
=12271 (reversing lower court decision to remove words "Jesus is King" from home's three story
turret; design approval requirements apply only to materials, not to their arrangement); Siegler,
supra note 54, at 3 (discussing Vacca v. Bd. of Managers of Primrose Lane Condo., 676 N.Y.S.2d
188 (App. Div. 1998) and Greenberg v. Bd. of Managers of Parkridge Condos., N.Y. L.J., Sept. 19,
2000, at 31 (Sup.Ct. Queens County), afd, 742 N.Y.S.2d 560 (App. Div. 2002) (nothing in
documents prohibited succah on balcony; owners association could not order removal or fine the
residents, and did not act in good faith)). For more on Greenberg, see Cooperatives and
Condominiums: Condominium Board Exceeds Its Powers by ProhibitingSuccah without Enacting
Rule or Regulation, 15 No. 1 N.Y. REAL EST. L. REP. 2 (2000). Although it did not go to litigation,
one homeowners association dropped its demands for resident to remove a creche when it realized
that it had no authority. See Novi Sub Backs Off Baby Jesus Stays Put," DETROIT NEWS, Nov. 30,
2005, at A01, available at 2005 WLNR 26929665; Editorial, NeighborhoodAssociations Shouldn't
Censor Christmas;Let Homes Display Religious Expression without Threats, DETROIT NEWS, Dec.
3, 2005, at E06, available at 2005 WLNR 26932859 (on the basis of a complaint from another
resident, owners association ordered the removal of a cr6che-but not secular ornaments like Santa
or Minnie Mouse-from resident's lawn and assessed weekly fines of $100 while it remained; after
residents sued, association dropped threats, apologized, and admitted that no CIC rule had been
violated because none governed temporary displays).
67. See infra notes 198-208 and accompanying text. State versions of the FHA are also
involved. See supranotes 54, 57; infra notes 206-08.
68. Religion-only restrictions, though facially discriminatory, are not automatically considered
discriminatory under the FHA. See supra note 9. Although the Civil Rights Division of the
Department of Justice takes the position that the FHA requires equal access to CIC common areas
for religious and non-religious meetings, no court has yet to apply the statute in this way to CICs.
See id. Even the case in which a court focused on facial discrimination as between religious and
nonreligious use of common areas was complicated by the existence of denominational
discrimination. See Daily v. N.Y.C. Hous. Author., 221 F. Supp. 2d 390 (E.D.N.Y. 2002)
(viewpoint discrimination in violation of the Free Speech Clause's public forum doctrine found
where a tenant in public housing was barred from holding a Bible study in common space where
non-religious uses were permitted; but also significant to analysis was that other religious uses were
permitted while this religious use was not).
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family, the Orthodox Jewish families, and the common area worshippers can
demonstrate that they were singled out for discrimination or that there was
particularly intense anti-denominational hostility in the enforcement of the
restriction, they would not be protected under current judicial interpretations
of the FHA.69 Thus, CIC prohibitions on religious symbols and uses are
acceptable, absent a strong showing of bias against a particular religious
denomination." Courts have avoided any innovative use of doctrines like
public policy to constrain enforceability. Residents caught in these
restrictions, unable or unwilling to exit the community, must move their
symbols or uses to a place not visible to any passersby." After all, they
have constructively consented to a carefully controlled visual environmentone that does not include the recognition of religion.
Obviously, there is a demand for religion-free residential life, and that
demand reflects something other than actionable discrimination. Those who
want to live without reminders of religion might consider its public
manifestation to be ugly, messy, offensive, divisive, discomforting, or even
threatening; they might be a member of a religious minority who feels
affronted by majority symbols; they might feel disturbed by the conduct of a
highly visible religious minority; 72 they might believe strongly that religion
belongs only inside the home and inside a house of worship; or they might
fear that anything out of the ordinary will lower property values. 73 Are these
legitimate grounds for allowing such environments? And even if some of
these concerns are legitimate, are there other values that outweigh them?

69. Indeed, in the actual case of the exclusive ban on religious services in the common room, no
FHA violation was found. See Savanna Club Worship Serv., Inc. v. Savanna Club Homeowners'
Ass'n, 456 F. Supp.2d 1223, 1234 (S.D. Fla. 2005).
70. A CIC does run the risk of a federal investigation by the DOJ in the event that the
condominium or homeowners association chooses to prohibit only religious symbols or religious
conduct. See supra note 9. But if the association chooses instead to regulate symbols or uses by
way of general, religion-neutral proscription applicable to all similarly situated residents, it is
completely within its rights so long as no denominational targeting is involved in the enforcement of
such proscriptions.
71. This was the outcome of the Hindu family's case: they were allowed to place their jhandi in
the front yard, but it had to be hidden by bushes. See supra note 53; see also Boodram v. Md. Farms
Condo., No. 93-1320, 1994 WL 31025 (4th Cir. Feb. 1, 1994) (Hindu resident prohibited from
placing flags on balcony could have done so if they "were placed out of sight" and not visible to any
passerby).
72. Aesthetic assimilation often hides not only religious identity but also cultural and ethnic
identity. See Michael W. McConnell, Believers as Equal Citizens, in OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP
AND DEMANDS OF FAITH: RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION INPLURALIST DEMOCRACIES 90 (Nancy L.
Rosenblum ed., 2000).
73. From the news items noted supra in notes 52-57, negative publicity and threats of litigation
can sometimes make an owners association rethink its decision. But, the news items tell a story. See
Charles C. Haynes, Opinion, Understand Each Other, MONTGOMERY ADVERT., Jan. 10, 2009,
available at 2009 WLNR 20122016 ("[T]he real cautionary tales are the small stories, the littlenoted religious tensions in neighborhoods and workplaces that are barometers of how well we are
addressing religious differences on a daily basis.").
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Below, this article attempts to address these questions and sets forth the
building blocks for a normative argument in favor of a social world that does
not suppress religious identity.
III. THE PROBLEM WITH RELIGION-FREE ENVIRONMENTS
Developers and owners associations can legally create religion-free
environments as long as their governing documents support the restrictions
and as long as they avoid anti-denominational animus that would lead to
actionable claims under the FHA. 74 Such toleration of religion-free
environments is grounded in the "social contract" of the CIC, which has
been described as:
[A] sort of quid pro quo where unit owners give up certain of their
fee rights, hand over the regulation of the units to an association in
order to best maintain the entire community. In exchange, unit
owners know that their neighbors will maintain their property in a
suitable fashion and that the common areas will be kept in proper
order for the use and enjoyment of all residents."
As we have seen, however, this superficially reasonable bargain makes
public forms of religious expression and association vulnerable to
prohibition by owners associations. In this author's view, such a bargain
cedes too much freedom to private restriction and is contrary to the dignity
of the human person, the common good of society, and one of the major
purposes of private property: providing the locus for religious exercise.
Drawn from both the Catholic intellectual tradition and American property
law, this normative argument is presented below.
A.

The Dignity of the Person and the Common Good of Society

The CIC's religion-free environment must be measured against the
common good of society. The common good-a normative vision central to
Catholic social thought, but overlapping much of contemporary political
theory-focuses on social conditions as they affect human development.
74. But see supra notes 9, 70 and accompanying text.
75. Savanna Club Worship Serv., Inc. v. Savanna Club Homeowners' Ass'n, 456 F. Supp. 2d
1223, 1231 (S.D. Fla. 2005).
76. For discussion of the various approaches to the common good, religious and philosophical,
see ROBERT K. VISCHER, CONSCIENCE AND THE COMMON GOOD: RECLAIMING THE SPACE BETWEEN
PERSON AND STATE 104-18 (2010) and McConnell, supra note 72, at 90.
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The common good is neither the state's interest nor the interest of the
majority or a particular group. It refers to:
[T]he totality of goods that create the conditions in which persons
flourish. In its fullest sense, the common good describes social
conditions designed to enable "the total human development" of the
person, such as human rights for individuals, social health and
development of the community, and a just, stable, and secure
order."
In Catholic social thought, the state plays "a limited, subsidiary role" in
promoting the common good. 8 It ensures the public order-civil rights,
public peace, and public morality-but it also coordinates and assists nonIndeed, all
state actors in their promotion of the common good.
institutions of civil society-including intermediary associations like
CICs-are supposed to create social conditions that are good for the human

77. Carmella, A Catholic View, supra note 17, at 266 (citing to the United States Conference of
Catholic Bishops, Catechism of the Catholic Church nos. 1906-09 (1994)); see also Declaration,
supra note 21, at 683-84 (The common good of society "consists in the entirety of those conditions
of social life under which men enjoy the possibility of achieving their own perfection in a certain
fullness of measure and also with some relative ease. Hence [it] consists chiefly in the protection of
the rights, and in the performance of the duties, of the human person." (citation omitted)); Pastoral
Constitution, supra note 23, at 284 ("[T]he common good embraces the sum of those conditions of
social life by which individuals, families, and groups can achieve their own fulfillment in a relatively
thorough and ready way." (citation omitted)); JOHN FINNIs, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS
154 (1980) (the common good refers to "the securing of a whole ensemble of material and other
conditions that tend to favour the realization, by each individual in the community, of his or her
personal development"); JACQUES MARITAIN, THE PERSON AND THE COMMON GOOD 50, 53-54

(1947) ("The end of society is the good of the community, of the social body. But if the good of the
social body is not understood to be a common good of human persons, just as the social body itself
is a whole of human persons, this conception also would lead to other errors of a totalitarian
type.... The common good is something ethically good. Included in it, as an essential element, is
the maximum possible development, here and now, of the persons making up the united multitude to
the end of forming a people, organized not by force alone but by justice." (emphasis in original));
Kyle Duncan, Subsidiarity and Religious Establishmentsin the United States Constitution, 52 VILL.
L. REv. 67, 87-88 (2007) ("The common good is inextricably bound to the good of individual
persons, as Maritain explains in his classic work, Man and the State. . . 'that each concrete person,
not only in a privileged class but throughout the whole body politic, may truly reach that measure of
independence which is proper to civilized life and which is ensured alike by the economic
guarantees of work and property, political rights, civic virtues, and the cultivation of the mind."').
See generally C.M.A. Mc Cauliff, The Friendshipof Pope Paul VI and Jacques Maritain and the
Declarationon Religious Freedom, 41 SETON HALL L. REv. (forthcoming 2011); Patrick McKinley
Brennan, Jacques Maritain (1882-1973), in THE TEACHINGS OF MODERN ROMAN CATHOLICISM ON
LAW, POLITICS, & HUMAN NATURE 106, 124-28 (John Witte, Jr. & Frank S. Alexander eds., 2006);
Angela C. Carmella, John Courtney Murray, S.J. (1904-1967), in THE TEACHINGS OF MODERN
ROMAN CATHOLICISM ON LAW, POLITICS, & HUMAN NATURE 181, 188-91 (John Witte, Jr. & Frank
S. Alexander eds., 2006).
78. Kalscheur, supra note 22, at 24.
79. See generally Carmella,Responsible Freedom, supra note 17, at 408-11, 442-47.
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person, with state assistance where needed but without state takeover.80 The
state respects the integrity of the institutions of civil society and intervenes
only when non-state actors thwart the common good in a way that threatens
public order. 8' The term "subsidiarity" refers to this model of an activist and
moral, yet limited, state that coordinates non-state actors toward the
common good. 82 As local, largely unregulated, non-state actors, CICs fit
easily into the model of subsidiarity-state intervention occurs primarily
when CICs fail to follow their own rules or discriminate on illegal grounds.
How might we think about CICs and the common good? Since the
common good is "inextricably bound to the good of individual persons,"8
we have to decide "what is good for the person." So we ask, what social
conditions precede and facilitate human development and human
flourishing, and what role does the CIC play in their creation? Obviously,
while it is the obligation of all persons and groups in civil society to promote
the common good, they must do so "in the manner proper to each."86 We
can easily see that a proper role for CICs in the promotion of the common
good is the creation of stable, secure neighborhoods, as they can provide not
only a safe place to live, but housing "that fulfill[s] a deep and natural
human yearning for community in both a social and political sense."87 The
literature on CICs offers a mixed record on this--certainly stable, secure
neighborhoods are created, but whether they are truly places of authentic
community has been a question at the heart of scholarly criticism and calls

80. Id.
8 1. Id.
82. See Vischer, supra note 76, at 104-05 ("Subsidiarity is ... premised on the empowerment of
individuals and groups to meet the needs around them, with the state acting, not as the primary locus
of social action, but in a supportive, secondary role. This dispersal of social authority represents the
'bottom up' ordering of society in which needs are met, where possible, by the moral agents who are
closest to them. .. . Only if the lower bodies cannot address a problem effectively should the higher
bodies step in.").
83. Id. at 103 ("The state, as society's only legitimate purveyor of coercive force, must act with
deference toward the dimension of the common good that is not defined by the collective will....
The state's self-restraint helps ensure that the common good is not defined and imposed from above
... but is instead realized from the bottom up, constituted by the conscience-driven decisions and
day-to-day actions of individuals and the communities to which they belong. The state's selfrestraint cannot be absolute, of course, for the common good requires a level of social justice and
order that only state authority can ensure.").
84. Duncan, supranote 77, at 88.
85. Richard W. Garnett, The Rights Questions About School Choice: Education, Religious
Freedom, and the Common Good, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1281, 1312 (2002).
86. Declaration,supra note 21, at 684.
87. Douglas W. Kmiec, Book Review, Property and Economic Liberty as Civil Rights: The
MagisterialHistory ofJames W Ely, Jr., 52 VAND. L. REv. 737, 753 (1999).
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for CIC reform." What about religious freedom? Is religious freedom an
aspect of the common good? And if it is, are CICs responsible for its
protection?
Religious freedom is indeed an essential element of the common good, a
condition critical to the flourishing of the human person. It is a fundamental
right in the U.S. Constitution, enshrined in the First Amendment,89 and
considered one of the universal human rights. 90 From the earliest days of the
republic, the free exercise of religion has been protected so long as it did not
threaten peace or order.9' Many state and federal statutes now protect
religious exercise generally, and thousands more contain religious
exemptions to allow for religious freedom in specific contexts.92 As part of
its public order function, the state protects the free exercise of religion as a
civil right-not only as against state actors but as against private actors as
well. 93 Though religion no longer holds the place it once did, it continues to
be recognized through its institutions, ideas, and adherents as a significant
contributor to society-in social services, in education and health care, in
protest movements and legal reform, in the generation and transmission of
ethical norms, and in the formation of communities of moral meaning and
the moral formation of persons. Moreover, religious freedom qua freedom is
a good as well.94 Because religious freedom recognizes the transcendent
commitments of the human person, it is critical to preventing claims asserted
by the state and the market, indeed by any human power, to the whole
human person.95 In this way it is often said to provide a "bulwark" against
88. See Franzese & Siegel, Trust and Community, supra note 29, at 1150-56; Franzese,
Discontents, supranote 29, at 339-47; Franzese, Village, supranote, 29, at 569-71.
89. U.S. CONsT. amend. I (providing in relevant part, that "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof").
90. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Ist plen.
mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948); see also C.M.A. Mc Cauliff, Cognition and Consensus in
the NaturalLaw Tradition and in Neuroscience: Jacques Maritain and the UniversalDeclarationof
Human Rights, 54 VLL. L. REv. 435 (2009); Mary Ann Glendon, Knowing the Universal
DeclarationofHuman Rights, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1153 (1998).
91. See McConnell, supra note 72, at 102-07.
92. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2006) (applicable to
federal law only under City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)); Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2006). Additionally, twelve states have enacted
state legislation that mirrors the federal RFRA, another twelve have interpreted their constitutions to
protect religious exercise with a strict scrutiny standard of review, and one did so by constitutional
amendment. Nicholas Nugent, Note, Toward a RFRA that Works, 61 VAND. L. REv. 1027, 1052 &
n.146 (2008); James E. Ryan, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic
Assessment, 78 VA. L. REV. 1407, 1445 (1992); Carmella, Responsible Freedom, supra note 17, at404 & nn.6-7.
93. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006) (prohibiting discrimination in
employment on the basis of religion and requiring reasonable accommodation of religion in
employment); Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (2006).
94. John H. Garvey, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? (1996).
95. In the United States, rights are not granted by the government but are antecedent to the state
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the state and other institutions." In short, religious freedom provides
essential structural conditions as well as specific social goods that contribute
to human flourishing. 97
The Second Vatican Council's Declaration on Religious Freedom
presents a compelling and coherent case for responsible religious freedom.
The Declaration's overarching theme is the strong presumption in favor of
freedom "as far as possible, and curtailed only when and in so far as
necessary." 98 Under that document, the right to religious freedom is
grounded in the dignity of the human person, in the person's "very nature."99
The Declaration teaches that "the social nature of man itself requires that he
should give external expression to his internal acts of religion; that he should
participate with others in matters religious; that he should profess his
religion in community."o Thus, all people:
[A]re to be immune from coercion on the part of individuals or of
social groups and of any human power, in such wise that in matters

religious no one is to be forced to act in a manner contrary to his
own beliefs. Nor is anyone to be restrained from acting in
accordance with his own beliefs, whether privately or publicly,
whether alone or in associationwith others, within due limits.10

The quoted language notes first that religious freedom consists in
freedom from both coercion and restraint; second, that religious exercise is
understood to be a multidimensional phenomenon-personal and communal,
private and public; and finally, that the entire civil society is involved in the
protection and promotion of religious freedom.1 02 As Professor Gregory
Kalscheur notes, the Declaration "insists that it is not the function of
government acting through law to take total responsibility for the promotion
of the common good of society." 03 Therefore, wholly aside from any
and inhere in the nature of the person. The state cannot make claim to the whole person because it
recognizes another authority, prior to and different from the state. See generally McConnell, supra
note 72, at 102-07.
96. Carmella, Responsible Freedom, supranote 17, at 410.
97. Id. at 403-12.
98. Declaration,supra note 21, at 687.
99. Id. at 679. "The right to religious freedom articulated by the Council is rooted in a
commitment to respect the exercise of responsible freedom that is demanded by human dignity."
Kalscheur, supra note 22, at 28.
100. Declaration,supra note 21, at 681.
101. Id. at 679 (emphasis added).
102. See id.
103. Kalscheur, supra note 22, at 14.
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considerations of state action, non-state actors are charged with respecting
religious freedom and should neither coerce nor restrain public religious
conduct.'0
Obviously no freedom is absolute, and the Declaration is clear that
religious freedom must be exercised responsibly.' 5 To explain the meaning
of restricting freedom "only when and in so far as necessary," the document
states:
The right to religious freedom is exercised in human society; hence
its exercise is subject to certain regulatory norms. In the use of all
freedoms, the moral principle of personal and social responsibility
is to be observed. In the exercise of their rights, individual men and
social groups are bound by the moral law to have respect both for
the rights of others and for their own duties toward others and for
the common welfare of all. 10 6
Precisely because religion is exercised in human society, obligations to
others that limit religious freedom become part of its very definition.
Naming those obligations can be difficult, but the Declaration gives some
guidance. The state appropriately constrains religious freedom, for instance,
when "abuses [are] committed on [the] pretext of religious freedom,"'o or
when the religious practice directly interferes with the rights of others, civic
peace, or public morality. 08 Similarly, groups within civil society that

104. All social groups and religious communities, in addition to government and the people as a
whole, must respect religious freedom. See Declaration, supra note 21, at 684. Despite its source in
one religious community, the Catholic intellectual tradition gives voice to ecumenical and indeed
universal ideas. See infra notes 147-156 and accompanying text (concerning Joseph William
Singer's democratic approach to property law); McConnell, supra note 72, at 91-100; MARITAIN,
supra note 77; MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF AMERICA'S
TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY 333 (2008).

105. See Declaration, supra note 21, at 685-86.
106. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
107. Id at 686.
108. Id. at 686-87; see also, Kalscheur, supra note 22, at 20 n.91 ("The foundation of human
society lies in the truth about the human person, or in its dignity, that is, in its demand for
responsible freedom. That which injustice is preeminently owed to the person is freedom-as much
freedom as possible-in order that society thus may be borne toward its goals, which are those of the
human person itself, by the strength and energies of persons in society bound together with one
another by love. Truth and justice, therefore, and love itself demand that the practice of freedom in
society be kept vigorous, especially with respect to the goods belonging to the human spirit and so
much more with respect to religion. Now this demand for freedom, following as it does from the
objective truth of the person in society and from justice itself, naturally engenders the juridical
relationship between the person and the public power. The public power is duty bound to
acknowledge the truth about the person, to protect and advance the person, and to render the justice
owed to the person." (quoting John Courtney Murray, S.J., Arguments for the Human Right to
Religious Freedom, in RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: CATHOLIC STRUGGLES WITH PLURALISM 229, 241 (J.

Leon Hooper, S.J. ed., 1993)).
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govern themselves must set limits only "when and in so far as necessary" in
order to ensure the reciprocity of rights and duties.1 09 Indeed, the CIC, as a
non-state "social group" and "human power" within civil society, is
responsible for protecting the religious freedom of its residents "in the
manner proper to" it, which includes the allowance of religious exercise in
public and in association with others." 0 Freedom can be curtailed-but only
when justified by necessity. In the CIC context, religious freedom can be
restricted when it is irresponsible-that is, when it threatens the security and
stability that can be reasonably expected, as when it interferes with
neighbors' safety, access, or the exercise of their civil or property rights.
The insights of the Declaration provide a radically different starting
point for thinking about religion in the CIC. Rather than assuming that
every aesthetic and social control incorporated within the "contract" for the
protection of property values is a social good, the Declaration starts with the
dignity and social nature of the person, the importance of social groups that
mediate between person and state, and the claim that no one should be
restrained from the publicly visible practice of religion unless necessity
demands it."' That perspective counsels rejection of the notion that all of
social life is contained within and governed by the contract. It challenges
the need for a comprehensive web of controls and expansive interpretations
of those controls.1 2 Indeed, the Declaration's perspective dovetails with
that of CIC reformers who would reduce regulation and allow only those
restrictions essential to life in common, with an eye toward promoting
Like the "new governance" reform movement that
neighborliness."'
109. Declaration,supra note 21, at 687.
110. Id. at 684 ("[T]he care of the right to religious freedom devolves upon the people as a whole,
upon social groups ... in virtue of the duty of all toward the common [good], and in the manner
proper to each.").
111. Id. at 679, 687.
112. "Law shapes social relations, and to avoid unjust and oppressive power relationships, it must
rule certain kinds of contractual arrangements as out of bounds." Singer, Minimum Standards, supra
note 24, at 156.
113. See Franzese, Village, supra note 29, at 591 ("Instead of imposing an exhaustive litany of
covenants, conditions and restrictions from the start, the declaration should contain only those few
rules deemed essential to promoting the community's basic structure and well-being."); Franzese &
Siegel, Trust and Community, supra note 29, at 1137-38 ("[T]he classic model of CIC organization
and governance is flawed because it presupposes that law and rules can do all of the work-that is,
the work that law does most successfully when in partnership with, if not deference to, appropriate
social norms. The standard cookie-cutter regime does not give organic norms of 'neighborliness,'
residing in systems of reciprocity and built on stocks of social capital, a chance to develop. Rather,
it encourages, tacitly or explicitly, prospective buyers, and then residents, to trust the developer's
template, and then to trust the homeowners association, and then to trust the association's governing
board to oversee a system predicated, from its very inception, on a lack of trust. This disjuncture
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challenges the command-and-control approach of the regulatory state with
an emphasis on participation and collaboration among stakeholders, the
Declaration's perspective on freedom and the common good reflects the rich
story of human sociability and community." 4
The Declaration's perspective on freedom that is accountable to the
community requires us to ask normative questions: what do we owe our
neighbors, and does it involve hiding one's religious identity? Obviously,
we are not supposed to undermine neighborhood security and stability. But
what level of security and stability should be reasonably expected? Surely,
the neighbors who want a religion-free environment would confine religious
exercise to the inside of homes. For them, neighborhood stability is better
achieved when religion is hidden-living in a residential community without
reminders of religion preserves aesthetics and economic value, avoids the
potential for offensive or threatening symbols, and prevents social division
based on religious identity. In a religion-free environment, religious
minorities need not be confronted by majoritarian symbols, and residents
need not be confronted by unfamiliar practices of religious minorities.
But this is not the vision of the Declaration, which flatly rejects such
privatization of religion."' The Declaration announces that people should
be free to celebrate their religion publicly and in association with others."16
This freedom is for all, for religious majorities and minorities."' In short,
religious pluralism is taken as a fact of social life that is better exposed than
hidden-you should have freedom to be yourself where you live. Indeed,
from this perspective, we see that the overvaluing of stability and uniformity
actually undermines the neighborliness and spontaneity needed for life in
community. The obsession with security renders it enormously difficult for
CICs to create authentic neighborhoods, to promote sociability, or to allow
people to work together "in justice and civility.""' The religion-free visual
and social environment for the CIC is simply not an option under the
Declaration, and residents have no justified expectation to such an
environment. Thus, a three-foot tall statue of Mary on a resident's front
lawn need not be banished to the back yard; "9 a four-inch mezuzah on one's
doorframe need not be removed or covered with a screen;120 a Hindu jhandi

constitutes one of several fundamental paradoxes implicit in the CIC form." (citations omitted)).
114. See Solomon, note 29, at 821-23; Carmella, John Courtney Murray, S.J., supra note 77, at
201-06. See generally McConnell, supranote 72.
115. Declaration,supra note 21, at 681.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 679.
118. Id. at 686.
119. See supra note 52.
120. See supra note 54.
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need not be hidden by bushes; 121 a painted image of a goddess need not be
removed from the driveway; 1 22 and a prayer meeting need not be banned
from the common room.123
What social expectations are justified? In other words, what is
responsible religious freedom in the CIC context? First, it is important to
note that the Declaration recognizes no right to oppress one's neighbor:
"society has the right to defend itself against possible abuses committed on
pretext of freedom of religion."' 24 A resident who uses a religious symbol
against a neighbor like one might use a spite fence gets no protection.125
Further, looking to settled expectations in property law, we know a resident
should not (1) pose threats to their neighbors' safety and health; (2) impede
access or use of property; or (3) unreasonably interfere with the use and
enjoyment of property.126 Religious exercise that creates a hazard, trespass,
or nuisance, or that visually overwhelms the neighbors' properties would be
irresponsible. In such cases, CICs would be justified in enforcing
regulations tailored to prevent such harms-but not to hide religious
identity. Thus, for instance, reasonable controls on the size of symbols
would be permissible, but controls that resulted in prohibition would have to
be specifically justified by necessity. Under this approach, a general ban on
stone structures, which would include religious statues along with other
heavy objects, would be justified in a hurricane-prone area. And of course,
CICs would be justified in making rules regarding the use of common
facilities, but would be required to ensure fair and equal access for religious
and nonreligious uses so that no group monopolized or impeded access to
those facilities. From the Declaration's perspective, responsible religious
freedom means religious exercise subject to regulation that is directly
responsive and proportional to the negative impacts it causes.12 7
B. Religious Freedom in a PrivateProperty Community

Professor Joseph Singer suggests that, when we determine the contours
of property relationships, we "evaluate the legitimacy of claims on both

121. See supra note 71.
122. See supra note 52.
123. See supra note 57.
124. Declaration, supra note 21, at 686.
125. When a structure is erected for the sole purpose of vexing one's neighbors, it is not religious
exercise but rather an enjoinable nuisance.
126. See generally JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 639-66 (6th ed. 2006).
127. See Declaration, supra note 21, at 687.
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sides by reference to norms underlying the framework of a free and
democratic society."l2 8 The analysis to this point has employed the
Declaration's articulation of those norms.129 In this sub-section, the analysis
shifts to American property law and notes some fundamental parallels.
Property norms, like the "religious freedom-necessary restraint" norms of
the Declaration, 30 place a high value on freedom, with restrictions on that
freedom intended to mitigate negative impacts of land use.
In addition to violating human dignity, the severe restrictions on religion
that could easily become the norm in CICs violate our fundamental legal and
political presumption that religious exercise occurs on private property. This
presumption has two facets. First, private property provides "a setting
within which individuals can exercise liberties . .. such as free speech,
religious activity, and private family life, without undue government
interference."131 And second, inasmuch as the Establishment Clause
interpretation limits government involvement in religious exercise on public
property, it points to private property as the appropriate location for such
activity.
Moreover, the Free Exercise Clause, as well as RLUIPA and
other religion-protective statutes, apply to religious exercise on private
property.13 Thus, widespread acceptance of religion-free environments in
CICs will subvert not only the strong presumption in favor of religious
freedom in private communities, as seen above, but also the strong
presumption that religious exercise-especially vibrant, theologically
significant symbolism and use-should occur, and indeed be encouraged, on
privateproperty.134

128. Joseph William Singer, Democratic Estates: Property Law in a Free and Democratic
Society, 94 CORNELL L. REv. 1009, 1060 (2009).
129. See supra notes 76-127 and accompanying text.
130. See Declaration,supra note 21, at 687.
131. JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY 23 (2000).
132. Religious symbols are permitted on governmental property that is not a traditional,
designated, or limited public forum only so long as they can be understood in civic, historic, or
secular terms. See infra notes 163-96 and accompanying text. Indeed, the reason this article
focuses exclusively on religiousexpression (and not expression generally) in CICs relates directly to
its unique limitation on public property. See Abner S. Greene, The PoliticalBalance of the Religion
Clauses, 102 YALE L.J. 1611, 1613 (1993) (arguing that certain limitations on religion under the
Establishment Clause lead to more robust Free Exercise protection). Although my focus is only on
protection of religious exercise, note that under a paradigm of fewer CIC restrictions, as some
reformers propose, see supra note 29, religious and non-religious expressive rights would likely gain
protection.
133. See Carmella,RLUIPA, supra note 14 at 503-16.
134. Obviously, the use of private property can be regulated, either by government (e.g., zoning)
or by private enforcement of covenants and nuisance claims. See, e.g., Rodrigue v. Copeland, 475
So. 2d 1071 (La. 1985) (enjoining a homeowner from operating a display consisting of loud and
extravagant music and lights during the Christmas season); Osborne v. Power, 890 S.W.2d 570 (Ark.
1994) (holding that a massive display of Christmas lights created a nuisance). But religious exercise
on private property continues to enjoy protection in the absence of important state interests, with
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Under the normative argument developed here, private property, as an
institution of civil society, is supposed to promote the common good by
creating and supporting the social, economic, and political conditions that
enable human development and flourishing. Property:
[S]ecures individual autonomy from government coercion, prevents
an over-concentration of political authority generally, and
encourages investment and economic development.... [P]roperty
is itself merely a means to the protection of person and family and
the freedom associated with both family life and economic
initiative....
The private nature of property is protected not
because ownership is a good in itself but because it fulfills higher

goods, including: the security against theft, civil disorder, and
violence; the incentive to work and to find worth in that work and
the efforts of others; and the development of neighborhoods that
fulfill a deep and natural human yearning for community in both a
social and political sense."'
The notion that property facilitates the exercise of rights and protects
social groups explains the presumption in our jurisprudence that religious
expression and association are properly located on private property. Of
course, property ownership is not a prerequisite to the possession of rightsrights inhere in the person. But exercising certain rights requires a physical
space, and in the exercise of rights, place matters. For instance, some rights
can be exercised on government property, like when people gather in a park

government regulation of religious land uses specifically constrained by case law in many states and
now by federal statute. See Carmella, RLUIPA, supra note 14; Angela C. Carmella, Land Use
Regulation of Churches, in RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES: A STUDY OF

IDENTITY, LIBERTY, AND THE LAW 565 (James A. Serritella ed., 2006); Angela C. Carmella, Liberty
and Equality: Paradigmsfor the Protection of Religious Property Use, 37 J. CHURCH & ST. 573
(1995). Moreover, private restrictions of religious use of private residential property are constrained
by the FHA's prohibition on religious discrimination and some targeted state legislation. See infra
notes 195-198, 210. Additionally, courts tend to be careful in applying zoning to home worship
situations. See, e.g., Konikov v. Orange Cnty., Fla., 410 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2005) (rabbi's use of
home for services 2-3 times per week did not make his home a synagogue, where nonreligious
meetings of similar frequency did not need a permit); State v. Cameron, 498 A.2d 1217 (N.J. 1985)
(minister's temporary use of his home for weekly services did not make it a "church" or "place of
worship" under the zoning code); LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 67 F.3d 412 (2d Cir. 1995) (zoning
out home synagogues violates FHA). But see, e.g., Grosz v. City of Miami Beach, 721 F.2d 729
(1 Ith Cir. 1983) (rabbi using garage as home synagogue violated zoning code), superseded by
statute, RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2006), as recognized in Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of
Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1225-26 (11th Cir. 2004).
135. Kmiec, supra note 87, at 753 (emphasis added).
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for a protest. 13 6 Some rights can be exercised on someone else's private
property, like leafleting in shopping malls and universities.'3 7 But an
individual or group with rights to real property can use that location for the
exercise of a host of additional rights. An owner of a home can erect a
religious display on that property or invite others to gather there for prayer.
A religious organization can build a house of worship on property it owns.
Religious symbols and uses on private property can be explicitly devotional,
catechetical, or worshipful. To the extent that property rights give the
holders of those rights a physical locus for the exercise of other rights, they
enable greater self-determination and greater religious freedom.
Because the CIC is an innovative creation of private property law,
sensitivity to religious freedom seems to fit quite naturally. Indeed, property
norms themselves suggest a close relationship to the norms of responsible
freedom under the Declaration. The first norm essential to the CIC's
promotion of religious freedom and creation of safe, stable, and neighborly
living arrangements is the taxonomy of traditional property interests. Each
resident owns either a condominium unit or a home and land, has exclusive
use to some features of the common space, and enjoys non-exclusive access
to other common features. This taxonomy can be used to determine the
expectations for religious expression and association appropriate to each
category so that freedom and restraint correlate with those expectations and
respect the reciprocal nature of the property ownership. When we consider
property that is individually owned, we typically recognize a high
expectation for religious exercise. Though home ownership in a CIC no
longer fits the traditional model, the expectation of the human person for
expression and association at one's home has not changed.138 And this
includes the common features to which a resident has exclusive rights,
which residents treat like their individually owned property. 3 9 Regardless
of the ownership of the underlying fee of the ground and the walls, the
resident still has exclusive use of her front door, her balcony, and her patio,
136. See Hague v. Comm. for Indust. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
137. Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341 (Cal. 1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980)
(shopping mall); N.J. Coal. Against War in the Middle E. v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650 A.2d 757 (N.J.
1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 812 (1995) (shopping mall); State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615 (N.J.
1980), appealdismissed sub nom, Princeton Univ. v. Schmid, 455 U.S. 100 (1982) (university).
138. Courts have acknowledged the distinction in other contexts. See, e.g., Comm. for a Better
Twin Rivers v. Twin Rivers Homeowners' Ass'n, 929 A.2d 1060 (N.J. 2007) (noting a particular
concern for expressive rights on private property; with respect to the sign restrictions, "it is the
private homeowner's property and not that of the Association that is impacted." Id. at 1073).
139. See Gerber v. Longboat Harbour N. Condo., Inc., 757 F. Supp. 1339, 1342 (M.D. Fla. 1991)
(whether railing immediately adjacent to unit and exterior wall of unit, to which plaintiff had
exclusive use, was considered common or individual property was an issue of material fact
precluding summary judgment). Note that with respect to exclusive use rights, the terms of the
easement define the nature of the use, not the holder of underlying fee. See First Unitarian Church
of Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City Corp., 308 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2002).

86

[Vol. 38: 57, 2010]

Religion-FreeEnvironments
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

as provided in her deed, and still thinks of those areas as extensions of
herself.140 The outside of a door, the outside of a home, the space in front of
her home, the balcony and patio-any of those visible spaces to which the
resident has exclusive claim-should be considered property of the resident,
whether owned or managed by the owners association, and should be treated
like the inside of the unit or home is treated. Much like a person is free to
control his outward appearance and wear religious garb, a resident should be
free to control the outward appearance of her home to the extent it expresses
religious identity.14' Even the U.S. Supreme Court considers the freedom to
express views from one's home to be a unique form of expression rooted at a
particular location.142 Thus, placing a mezuzah on the doorframe or a creche
on the front lawn should be considered a legitimate expectation for such
property.
Additionally, while expectations for religious exercise in common
spaces should be lower than expectations related to individually-owned and
exclusively-used spaces, residents should still expect equal access to
generally available spaces for religious and non-religious uses and displays.
Clubhouse facilities, meeting rooms, auditoriums-anywhere gatherings are
accommodated-should have an equal access policy.143 Reasonable time,
place, and manner regulation should be sufficient to ensure fair and equal
access to (and prevent monopolization of and conflict regarding) common
use property.'"

140. See generally Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REv. 957 (1982)
("Most people possess certain objects they feel are almost part of themselves.").
141. See, e.g., Michelle Cole & Betsy Hammond, Governor Signs Repeal on Teachers' Religious
Dress; Ban will Lift in July 2011, OREGONLIVE.COM (Apr. 1, 2010, 1:08PM) http://www.oregon
live.com/ education/index.ssf/2010/04/governor..signsrepeal-on_teach.html.
142. The Court struck down an ordinance that prohibited signs on residential property as a
violation of the Free Speech Clause. See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994) ("A special
respect for individual liberty in the home has long been part of our culture and our law; that principle
has special resonance when the government seeks to constrain a person's ability to speak there.
Most Americans would be understandably dismayed, given that tradition, to learn that it was illegal
to display from their window an 8- by 11-inch sign expressing their political views." Id. at 58
(emphasis in original) "Displaying a sign from one's own residence often carries a message quite
distinct from placing the same sign someplace else, or conveying the same text or picture by other
means." Id. at 56 (citations omitted)).
143. Note that this is the interpretation of the FHA proffered by the Civil Rights Division of the
U.S. Department of Justice. See supra note 9.
144. The concept of time, place, and manner restrictions has developed under the Free Speech
Clause of the First Amendment. See, e.g., Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (picketing
without a license on public streets is not justified when statutory prohibition is not aimed at
restraining free speech); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115-17 & n.30 (1972)
("[R]easonable 'time, place and manner' regulations may be necessary to further significant
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In addition to the taxonomy of interests and the attached expectations, a
second property norm gives voice to the contours of restraint-since land
uses in a given area can conflict, a high value is placed on preventing or
mitigating negative impacts of incompatible land uses. 14 5 This fundamental
insight from more than a century of land use law coincides with the
Declaration's perspective on the human person and religious freedom. The
notion that conduct on private property can be restrained when necessary to
control or eliminate its negative impacts on neighbors is parallel to the
Declaration's structure of responsible freedom-freedom can be restrained
when and insofar as it is necessary. 14 6 Religious exercise with negative
impacts on neighbors' safety, access, and exercise of rights should also be
curtailed.
Professor Singer recognizes the normative task involved in articulating
"the appropriate contours of property relationships in a free and democratic
society."147 No one value or right trumps all others. To describe this
"democratic model" of property, he uses the example of a CIC resident
posting a political sign in her yard:
[We] would first ask whether denying someone the right to put up a
political sign on her property violates basic norms governing social,
political, and economic relationships in a polity that treats each
person with equal concern and respect. [And even if not] ... we
should still consider whether such a regulation should be
governmental interests, and are permitted.").
145. The Restatement notes that the rulemaking powers of a CIC are generally limited to
prevention of nuisance-like impacts on surrounding properties. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:
SERVITUDES § 6.7 cmt. b (2000). It provides that with respect to the CIC's rulemaking powers, the
CIC:
(H]as the power to adopt reasonable rules designed to (a) protect community members
from unreasonable interference in the enjoyment of their individual lots or units and the
common property caused by use of other individually owned lots or units .... Absent
specific authorization in the declaration, the [CIC] does not have the power to adopt rules
... that restrict the use ... of, or behavior within, individually owned lots or units.
Id. §6.7(2)(a)-(3). The Restatement notes further that:
[T]he rationale for not giving an expansive interpretation to an association's power to
make rules restricting use of individually owned property is based in the traditional
expectations of property owners that they arefree to use theirproperty for uses that are
not prohibited and do not unreasonably interfere with the neighbors' use and enjoyment
of their property. People purchasing property in a [CIC], which is usually subject to
specific use restrictions set forth in the declaration, are not likely to expect that the
association would be able, under a generally worded rulemaking power, to impose
additionaluse restrictions on theirproperty. On the other hand, they are likely to expect
that the association will be able to protect them from neighborhood nuisances by
adoption of preventative rules. Securing private protection from nuisance-like activity is
one of the frequently cited attractions of [CICs].
Id. § 6.7 cmt. b (emphasis added).
146. Declaration,supra note 21, at 687.
147. Singer, DemocraticEstates, supra note 128, at 1057.
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imposed ... either because it protects justified expectations or
because it accords with settled convictions about rights that ought to
go along with possession of land.... The question then is whether
owners should be free to waive those protections when they buy
property regulated by a homeowners association.... Do we value
the rights of... neighbors to live in a setting without such signs
more than we value the right to post signs relevant to political

contests? ... These questions revolve around a core normative
issue: Is the right to post a political sign on one's property one of
those self-evident inalienable rights that democracies should
recognize? ...

Answering these questions requires us to make

substantive choices about the interests at stake, the values those
interests implicate, the relative strength, relevance, and cogency of
those values in particular social settings, the social relationships that
will result from the choice of legal rule, the opportunities that will
be enabled or cut off, and the relation between property rights and
political and social life.. .. We are obligated to recognize that the
definition of property rights does not merely involve promoting the
autonomy of the owner .... Property owners have obligations to
use their rights in ways that are compatible with the basic norms of
My own view is that it is hard to see why the
our society ....
[neighbors'] interests would outweigh the [resident's] interest in
participating in the political process in a manner that is customary in
[The neighbors] may wish to live in a
the United States ....
tranquil neighborhood that does not exhibit contentious political
views. But my point is that the democratic model requires us to
evaluate the legitimacy of claims on both sides by reference to
14 8
norms underlying the framework of a free and democratic society.

Religious exercise on one's property, like political participation through
the posting of yard signs, represents a basic societal norm. Prohibiting it
does not "accord[] with settled convictions about rights that ought to go
along with possession of land"l4 9-in contrast, the settled convictions
actually supportfreedom of religion on one's property.so If property owners
have the obligation to use their property in a way that comports with the
basic norms of society, then they will not ask their neighbors to hide their
religious identity; religious exercise should represent a non-waivable right
148. Id. at 1057-60 (emphasis added).
149. Id. at 1058.
150. See infra Part III.B.

89

within a democracy.' 51 Because the intellectual tradition of Catholic social
thought focuses primarily on responsibility rather than autonomy, it
promotes a vision of responsible religious exercise that is compatible with
the security and stability that can be reasonably expected within a CIC.
Such a balanced perspective, known to religious, philosophical, and legal
traditions, is in step with the dignity of the person and the common good.
What social life is generated by the proposed property regime? In
Professor Singer's words, what "opportunities [for social relationships] will
be enabled or cut off'? 52 First, residents would enjoy (1) a high degree of
religious freedom on property they own or to which they have exclusive
claim and (2) an equal degree of freedom with other residents on common
property to which they have non-exclusive general access. Second,
identifiable negative impacts on neighbors would be addressed by controls
tailored to fit those specific impacts. Expressive and associational freedoms
for people of all different faiths make the CIC a better community than one
in which religious identity is suppressed. Because CICs emphasize
reciprocity and interdependence among residents and their property interests,
they are capable of recognizing the social character of the person. And
because residents can enjoy religious freedom and flexibility in interpersonal
relationships, CICs are capable of honoring the dignity of the person.
Further, because CICs can structure their governance in a way that provides
opportunities for meaningful participation of residents to determine
appropriate restrictions on freedom, CICs are capable of supporting the
rational and responsible dimensions of the person.' CICs thus present the
opportunity for dynamic life in a private property community, for "the
protection of person and family and the freedom associated with ... family
life" and "development of neighborhoods that fulfill a deep and natural
human yearning for community in both a social and political sense."' 54 By
protecting religious expression and association for all in the community, the
CIC takes a step closer to being the kind of community that promotes civility
without denying differences.
But expansively interpreted and zealously enforced restrictions that

151. The New Jersey Supreme Court upheld CIC controls on political yard signs, but would not
have upheld a flat prohibition. See Comm. for a Better Twin Rivers v. Twin Rivers Homeowners'
Ass'n, 929 A.2d 1060, 1073-74 (N.J. 2007) ("Notably, the Association permits expressional
activities to take place on plaintiffs' property but with some minor restrictions" that were found not
to be unreasonable, oppressive, or confiscatory).
152. See supranote 148 and accompanying text.
153. This point regarding human agency comports with the understanding of the person in the
Catholic intellectual tradition, which notes that "[tihe person is 'an active participant in the
fashioning of his [or her] own social and political destiny.' The person is not 'a merely passive
element in the social order,' but is 'its subject, its foundation and its end."' Carmella, A Catholic
View, supra note 17, at 262-63 (citation omitted).
154. Kmiec, supranote 87; see also supra note 34.
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yield the religion-free environment of the CIC neither respect the dignity of
the person nor create social conditions for human flourishing. They impede
the creation of true community and generate resentment toward the owners
association and the entire community.155 Indeed, the servitude regime
subverts the normal presumption in favor of freedom by substituting a
presumption in favor of restraint. By prohibiting responsible public
exercises of religion, the CIC privatizes religion in ways unrelated to the
protection of justifiable expectations.15 6 Once both public property and
substantial numbers of private property communities are restricted in
religious exercise, one may begin to wonder just where religion is allowed.
IV. PREVENTING THE GROWTH OF RELIGION-FREE ENVIRONMENTS

Human dignity and the common good demand a new respect for
responsible religious freedom in CICs. In order to halt and reverse moves
toward religion-free environments, courts should refuse to enforce CIC
restrictions that prohibit religious association or expression when those
restrictions (1) interfere with reasonable expectations of use and access
attached to various types of property and (2) are not directly and narrowly
responsive to an impact caused by the religious conduct. On what grounds
could courts do this? If legislation were enacted to protect religious exercise
in CICs, obviously courts would not be able to enforce covenants and rules

155. See generally Franzese & Siegel, Trust and Community, supra note 29.
156. See Brown, supra note 2, at 158 (discussing the Canada Supreme Court decision which
announced that "freedom of religion is indeed a freedom exercisable in public."). The privatization
of religion has been noted occasionally by the U.S. Supreme Court, but usually without realizing that
its own decisions have provided the engine for it (or confusing the public exercise of religion with
government-sponsored exercises of religion). See Justice Scalia's dissent in Lee v. Weisman, 505
U.S. 631, 645 (1992), in which he describes the majority's treatment of religion as "some purely
personal avocation that can be indulged entirely in secret, like pornography, in the privacy of one's
room." Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). The privatization thesis has been discussed in the context of
governmental attempts to remove religious groups from public forums. See JOHN T. NOONAN, JR. &
EDWARD MCGLYNN GAFFNEY, JR., RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: HISTORY, CASES, AND OTHER
MATERIALS ON THE INTERACTION OF RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT 374-75 (2001). They quote

theologian David Tracy, who wrote that religion is:
[T]he single subject about which many intellectuals can feel free to be ignorant. Often
abetted by the churches, they need not study religion, for "everybody" already knows
what religion is: It is a private consumer product that some people seem to need. Its
former social role was poisonous. Its present privatization is harmless enough to wish it
well from a civilized distance. Religion seems to be the sort of thing one likes "if that's
the sort of thing one likes."
Id. at 374 (quoting DAVID TRACY, THE ANALOGICAL IMAGINATION: CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY AND
THE CULTURE OF PLURALISM 13 (1981)).
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that contravened the law.s 7 In the absence of such legislation, however,
courts can invoke the traditional property doctrines of unenforceability"'restrictions on responsible religious freedom violate public policy and are
unreasonable because they violate the dignity of residents, undermine the
common good, and subvert the settled presumption of religious freedom on
private property.
This more traditional property approach gives concrete legal expression
to the concepts expressed in the Declaration. The Declaration embeds
religious freedom within civil society, calls for the public exercise of
religion, and requires attention to the welfare of others affected by that
religious exercise.' 59 It accepts restrictions when necessity dictates, and
recognizes that the determination of "necessity" is a normative judgment of
society.160 The public policy analysis undertaken by courts invites
consideration of the same concerns. It involves a balancing of interests,
assessing factors such as the impact of the restriction on religious practice,
the societal interests negatively affected by enforcement, and the harms
experienced by neighbors who want enforcement.16'
This traditional
approach also comports with the principle of subsidiarity and with the state's
public order role in protecting civil rights and public peace-courts are
justified in intervening to protect persons when non-state actors use their
coercive powers to suppress responsible religious exercise. 62
The more traditional property approach of holding covenants
unenforceable on public policy grounds avoids any consideration of state

157. See, e.g., Freedom of Religious Expression in the Home Act of 2008, H.R. 6932, 110th
Cong. (2008). This bill, which was designed in part to overturn Bloch v. Frischolz, 533 F.3d 562
(7th Cir. 2008), was proposed to amend the FHA to prevent discrimination relating to the display of
religious symbols. See Wertheimer, supra note 54. But, the Seventh Circuit vacated the decision en
banc and issued a new decision in Bloch v. Frischholz, 587 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 2009). No further
action was taken on the legislation; it has not been reintroduced in subsequent sessions of Congress.
One possibility involves amending the FHA to include a religious accommodation provision
(like that found in Title VII) applicable to the CIC context. Title VII provides the only mandatory
accommodation for religion by private actors, unless such accommodation would impose an undue
hardship on the employer. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006); see also Trans World Airlines v.
Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977). Under such a statutory model, residents would be able to challenge
general CIC restrictions that impeded their religious use or display; owners associations would have
to demonstrate the necessity of the restriction. Evaluating the wisdom of such an amendment is
outside the scope of this article.
158. For a similar argument, see generally Shelley Ross Saxer, Shelley v. Kraemer's Fitieth
Anniversary: "A Time for Keeping; a Time for Throwing Away"?, 47 U. KAN. L. REv. 61 (1998)
(arguing against the use of the state action theory as articulated in Shelley to fight racially restrictive
private covenants).
159. See supra notes 21, 77, 98, 111 and accompanying text.
160. See supranotes 107-109 and accompanying text.
161. See infra notes 226-233 and accompanying text.
162. See supranotes 101-110 and accompanying text.
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action and the thorny jurisprudence of the Religion Clauses. 163 Some
commentators have argued that religious exercise (and other rights) in CICs
would be better protected if owners associations were treated as state actors
or if judicial enforcement of private restrictions were treated as state
action.'6" Others have suggested the application of constitutional norms
even in the absence of state action. 165 This author rejects those positions.
The Constitution is the standard against which religious exercise on public
property and public restrictions on religious exercise are measured, but the
common good of the civil society must be the standard against which private
regulation of religious exercise on private property is measured.166
Constitutionalizing the CIC would lead not to the protection of religious
exercise, but instead to the wholesale adoption of the religion-free
environment as the constitutional norm. In the process of borrowing
constitutional norms, courts are more likely to apply the norm of restraintfrom the Establishment Clause-than norms of freedom.'16 Even the Free
Exercise Clause offers no countervailing vision of religious freedom. It
offers only a non-discrimination norm, which might ensure equal access in
some situations but does little to address most instances of CIC restrictions
on religious exercise.168
By considering the owners association a state actor, or CIC governance
state action, courts would treat common property as if it were government
property.'16
Religious symbols and uses are allowed on government
property only if they are secularized by context or are otherwise understood

163. See supranote 89.
164. See, e.g., Steven Siegel, The Constitution and Private Government: Toward the Recognition
of ConstitutionalRights in Private Residential Communities Fifty Years after Marsh v. Alabama, 6
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 461 (1998); Kuzenski, supra note 48, at 57-59; Janet M. Bollinger,
Homeowners' Associations and the Use of Property Planning Tools: When Does the Right to
Exclude Go Too Far?, 81 TEMP. L. REv. 269, 275-84, 289-97 (2008); Chadderdon, supra note 38,
at 233; Note, supra note 64, 473-77; 76 AM. JuR. 3DPROOFOFFACTS§ 89 (2009).
165. See, e.g., Paula A. Franzese & Steven Siegel, The Twin Rivers Case: Of Homeowners
Associations, Free Speech Rights and PrivatizedMini-Governments, 5 RUTGERS J. L. & POL'Y 729
(2008) (discussing Comm. for a Better Twin Rivers v. Twin Rivers Homeowners' Ass'n, 929 A.2d
1060 (N.J. 2007), where the court found that constitutional norms apply to CICs even in the absence
of state action).
166. The only plausible state action argument would involve the following types of situations: if
local zoning authorities required the enactment of particular private restrictions, RLUIPA might
strike down the zoning action, thereby affecting the private restrictions indirectly; additionally, one
might argue state action if private restrictions excluded religious uses from an entire municipality.
167. See infra notes 181-96 and accompanying text.
168. See infra notes 211-214 and accompanying text.
169. See supranotes 32-33 and accompanying text.
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primarily in civic or historical terms.170 All the property the CIC owns or
manages on behalf of residents-technically all property within the CIC
other than individually owned units or subdivision lots-would thus be
subject to this establishment norm. And applying this norm to CIC common
property would mean the mandate of a religion-free environment. This
outcome would be inevitable because CIC residents' conduct heightens,
rather than minimizes, the theological significance of religious symbols and
uses; religious symbols are put on display and people gather for unabashedly
religious reasons. Under the establishment norm, however, such explicit
theological expression, undiminished by alternative interpretations, is not
allowed. Thus, in CICs, where much if not all of the external visual
environment is common property owned or managed by the CIC, the
religion-free norm would govern land use decisions, even those affecting
exclusive use areas and common areas available to all residents.
But establishment norms should not apply to CICs. They have been
specifically developed in the context of, and with restrictions relevant to,
governmental actors and government property. 71 They fail to take into
account the nature of the CIC as a non-state actor, with obligations to
promote the common good of civil society and the free religious exercise of
its residents.
A. ConstitutionalizingCICs: A Bad Idea
Throughout the 20th century, many state courts began to accord
constitutional protection to religious land uses and to strike down zoning
ordinances that barred houses of worship from residential zones.172
Churches began to argue, relying on a Shelley state action claim,17 3 that
private covenants creating residential neighborhoods (and thereby similarly
preventing houses of worship) should also be unenforceable as applied to
75
them. With one exception,174 no court accepted the state action argument.
170. See infra note 183-84 and accompanying text.
171. See infa notes 181-196 and accompanying text; see also Carmella, Symbolic Expression on
Public Property,supranote 16.
172. See Angela C. Carmella, Land Use Regulation of Churches, in RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS
IN THE UNITED STATES: A STUDY OF IDENTITY, LIBERTY, AND THE LAW 565 (James A. Serritella
ed., 2006).
173. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding that judicial enforcement of a racially
restrictive covenant constituted state action in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment).
174. See W. Hill Baptist Church v. Abbate, 261 N.E.2d 196 (Ohio Ct. Com. P1. 1969).
175. See, e.g., Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 451 F.3d 643 (10th Cir.
2006); Bd. of Zoning Appeals of Meridian Hills v. Schulte, 172 N.E.2d 39, 44 (Ind. 1961); Church
of Christ v. Metro Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 371 N.E.2d 1331 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978); Ginsburg v.
Yeshiva of Far Rockaway, 358 N.Y.S.2d 477, 482 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974); Christ Methodist Church
v. Macklanburg, 177 P.2d 1008 (Okla. 1947) (citing numerous cases holding that churches are bound
by title restrictions); McDonald v. Chaffin, 529 S.W.2d 54 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1975) (house used as a
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Private restrictions were repeatedly held to bind any owner with notice
(including churches), regardless of any impact on the free exercise of
religion.'16
The resistance to adopting the state action argument or to holding
covenants to constitutional standards persists. 177 Some courts have bestowed
constitutional protections to some activities on private property, but the
efforts remain quite narrow in scope."11 Simply put, most state courts
"recognize either explicitly or implicitly the principle that 'the fundamental
nature of a constitution is to govern the relationship between the people and
their government, not to control the rights of the people vis-A-vis each
other."'li79

Though it appears to defeat religious freedom, refusing to
constitutionalize the CIC is paradoxically a good decision for religious
freedom. The Constitution, as currently understood, would offer no bulwark
against the trend toward religion-free environments. Though (for reasons
explained in Section III above) covenants that create and sustain a religionfree environment should be unenforceable, norms of specific constitutional
provisions should not be employed to accomplish that end. The structural
analogy between governmental property and common property has already

church violated residential only restriction); Voice of the Cornerstone Church Corp. v. Pizza Prop.
Partners, 160 S.W.3d 657 (Tex. App. 2005) (church is bound by restrictive covenant limiting uses to
commerciallindustrial); Ireland v. Bible Baptist Church, 480 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. App. 1972)
(injunction to compel removal of church structures that violate single family residential covenants);
see also Peter L. Maroulis, Note, Restrictive Covenants as a Device to Control Religious Uses, 12
SYRACUSE L. REv. 347 (1961) (collecting cases); Robert G. Ritz, Note, Restrictive Covenants and
Religious Uses: The ConstitutionalInterplay, 29 SYRACUSE L. REv. 993 (1978) (collecting cases).
176. See supra note 47.
177. See, e.g., Comm. for a Better Twin Rivers v. Twin Rivers Homeowners' Ass'n, 929 A.2d
1060 (N.J. 2007).
178. In the CIC context, see Gerber v. Longboat Harbour N. Condo., 757 F. Supp. 1339 (M.D.
Fla. 1991) (state action found when court enforced CIC restriction against American flag); Comm.
for a Better Twin Rivers v. Twin Rivers Homeowners' Ass'n, 929 A.2d 1060 (N.J. 2007) (no state
action found but state constitutional norms applicable nonetheless). Outside the CIC context, cases
involve the issue whether free speech protections require owners of private facilities that are open to
the public (like shopping malls and college campuses) to allow solicitation or leafleting by the
public. A few states-Califomia, Massachusetts, New Jersey-have found free speech and related
rights applicable in these circumstances. Id. at 1070-71.
179. Twin Rivers, 929 A.2d at 1071 (quoting Southcenter Joint Venture v. Nat'l Democratic
Policy Comm., 780 P2d 1282, 1286 (Wash. 1989)). Resistance to holding CICs to constitutional
standards exists even among the few states that have indicated a willingness to do so. See Twin
Rivers, 929 A.2d at 1071 (applying norms of free speech and association to CICs even in the absence
of state action, but restrictions are still enforceable when property is not open generally to public and
when residents agree to abide by them, which are common characteristics of every CIC).
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been adopted by courts dealing with rights claims in other contexts. 80 In the
religious exercise context, the analogy would result in the Establishment
Clause serving as the primary source of values governing the CIC property,
which in turn would inexorably lead to a religion-free environment. 181 This
outcome would violate the only constitutional norm that is relevant to the
CIC: the overarching constitutional design that directs religious exercise
away from governmental property and towards private property.
The Establishment Clause, which restricts government speech, does not
permit the display of theologically significant religious symbols on public
property 82 unless in a given instance the placement, context, or shared
interpretation gives primacy to a civic, historic, or secular meaning.'83
Similarly, religious uses occurring on public property must be primarily
understood in civic, historic, or secular terms.1 84 Of course, the clause "does
not compel the government to purge from the public sphere all that in any
180. This analogy was employed in Twin Rivers, 929 A.2d 1060. Although the case did not
involve the Religion Clauses, it did involve the New Jersey Constitution's protection of free speech.
Id. at 1076. The homeowners' association had restricted free speech on both individually owned
property and on commonly owned property. Id. at 1063-64. The New Jersey Supreme Court noted
the distinction between the resident's property and the CIC's property. Id. at 1072. The issue of
whether the CIC had met its free speech obligations to the resident was framed in terms of its
authority to govern its own property, as well as to restrict the individual resident's property. Id.
181. One particularly harmful appropriation of establishment norms has occurred in the CIC
context: the notion of religion's inherent divisiveness. Courts have interpreted the Establishment
Clause as a mechanism to prevent social conflict attributable to religious divisions. See, e.g., Van
Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005). By repeated invocation, the "divisiveness" of religion has
entered our legal discourse, and it is easy for courts to assume it is pervasive. Two courts have
upheld the banning of religious services in common rooms and assumed the divisive nature of
religion. See Savanna Club Worship Serv. v. Savanna Club Homeowners' Ass'n, 456 F. Supp. 2d
1223, 1233 (S.D. Fla. 2005) ("The right to religious freedom must encompass the right to be free
from religion."); Neuman v. Grandview at Emerald Hills, Inc., 861 So. 2d 494, 498 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2003) ("Prohibiting those types of assembly which will have a particularly divisive effect on
the condominium community is a reasonable restriction. The Board found that permitting the
holding of regular worship services and the competition among various religious groups for use of
the auditorium would pose such conflict.").
182. "Public property" in this analysis does not include government-owned property used as a
traditional, designated or limited public forum, in which private expression is permitted. For
discussion of the public forum doctrine, see Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125
(2009) and Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995).
183. See generally Salazar v. Buono, 130 S.Ct. 1803 (2010) (latin cross); McCreary Cnty. v.
ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (Ten Commandments); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (Ten
Commandments); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (creche); Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU,
492 U.S. 573 (1989) (creche and menorah); Carmella, Symbolic Expression on Public Property,
supranote 16. When a person puts a religious symbol on property to which she has exclusive claim
or uses common property of the CIC for religious assembly, we can presume that she acts primarily
for religious purposes and not primarily for civic or historic purposes because only governments are
bound by such conditions.
184. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 18, 34 (2004) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in judgment; Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in judgment) ("under God" in pledge of
allegiance); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (graduation prayer); Marsh v. Chambers, 463
U.S. 783 (1984) (legislative prayer).
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way partakes of the religious,"18 ' but the Supreme Court's doctrine is quite
clear that religious objects on public property must be definable in
nonreligious terms. These norms, when applied to the common property
owned or managed by the owners association, would make religious objects
or uses suspect wherever they might appear--on a patio or balcony, in the
hallway, on one's door, on the grounds, on the exterior walls, inside or
outside the clubhouse, or even on the soil right outside the front door. 86 The
temptation to treat all common property the same, without making important
distinctions based on the nature of the use and access, would render the
Thus, even "exclusive use" property (such as
prohibitions universal.'
doors and balconies) and common property to which general access is
allowed (such as meeting rooms) would be treated like government property.
Putting this together with extensive, generally applicable aesthetic
restrictions on individually owned property (which are allowed under the
Free Exercise Clause), the "protection" of constitutional norms would yield
a religion-free environment.
The main Establishment Clause inquiry asks a reasonable observer

185. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 699 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring).
186. The notion that residents would be protected by the public forum doctrine is interesting, but
ultimately unpersuasive. Like municipalities, owners associations would be under no obligation to
open or designate particular spaces to be used as public forums. Carmella, RLUIPA, supra note 14,
at 508. Even if some spaces were so designated, religious exclusions may nonetheless be wholly
constitutional. See Daily v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 221 F.Supp.2d 390, 398 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (applying
public forum doctrine to common areas in public housing but noting that, under Supreme Court
precedent, the state may reserve the forum for certain groups or for the discussion of certain topics).
It is also critical to note that the Establishment Clause governs the public forum doctrine: a common
area that allows private expression may nonetheless be subject to a finding that the forum itself
endorses religion from the perspective of a "reasonable observer." See Capitol Square Review &
Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 777 (1995).
As to the possibility that establishment norms would not apply to exclusive use areas because
"private" religious exercise of residents cannot be attributed to the CIC, note that the CIC restrictions
are made precisely on the assumption that these areas are common areaswithin its control. Indeed,
if the CIC took no action to remove the symbols, those symbols would likely be understood as the
CIC's expression. For an example of the analogy, see the facts and procedural history of Salazar v.
Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010) (acknowledging decision in Buono v. Norton, 371 F.3d 543 (9th Cir.
2004) that religious symbol on government property, which had been placed there by a private party,
was an unconstitutional government endorsement of religion).
187. See, for example, Vos Iz NEIAS?, supra note 55, in which attorney for the condominium
provided a statement that read: "The board of directors is enforcing their documents prohibiting
owners from making temporary alterations to the common element. It's Tantamount [sic] to a
Christian making an alter [sic] by the pool during Lent. To allow one owner to do this we will have
to allow 451 owners to do this." This concern fails to understand that prohibiting religious symbols
at the pool is entirely different from prohibiting them on one's balcony. The expectation on property
to which one has exclusive rights should be treated differently from common property that is already
dedicated to a specific, non-expressive use for all residents in common.
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whether the government's action can be viewed as an endorsement of
religion-that is, whether one's religion is made relevant to her standing in
the political community. The "endorsement test" is highly nuanced, so its
application in cases involving religious symbols leads to highly variable and
subjective outcomes."" While not all claims of offense prove an
endorsement,' 89 fear of such claims easily creates a chilling effect.190 In the
CIC context, where claims of offense are already common, 9 ' the imposition
of establishment norms would compel a religion-free common
environment.192 Any complaint to the owners association-that someone
was offended by a statue of Buddha on a balcony or a menorah in the
common room during Chanukah-would be enough to trigger concern of
CIC endorsement. CICs would likely respond by imposing blanket
exclusions on religious expression, which are attractive as an easily
administrable bright line rule. 93 Such exclusions go too far. While it would
not be appropriate, for instance, for the CIC to associate itself with a
permanent religious symbol at the entrance alongside its identifying
signage,194 the notion that any religious symbol on any common property
188. The "reasonable observer" is asked whether the government has endorsed or disapproved of
religion in a way that makes (or would be understood to make) religion relevant to a citizen's
standing in the political community. Applying the test involves examining "both the subjective and
objective components of the message communicated by a government action . .. to determine
whether the action carries a forbidden meaning." Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (O'Connor,
J., concurring). This approach focuses on "whether a reasonable observer may fairly understand
government action to send a message to non-adherents that they are outsiders, not full members of
the political community." Id. at 687-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
189. "We do not hold that every state action implicating religion is invalid if one or a few citizens
find it offensive. People may take offense at all manner of religious as well as nonreligious
messages, but offense alone does not in every case show a violation." Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S.
577, 597 (1992).
190. See, for example, the government's rationale for excluding religion in Rosenberger v. Rector
& Visitors of University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 845-46 (1995).
191. See supranotes 52-55.
192. See Poliakoff, supra note 52 (noting environment free of any holiday decorations may be
completely within the authority of owners association); G. Robert Kirkland & Michael A. Inman,
Association Should Clearly Define Rules for Holiday Decorations,VIRGINIAN-PILOT (Norfolk, Va.),
Nov. 23, 2002, (Real Estate Weekly), at 2, available at 2002 WLNR 2421415 (advice to
condominium association for holidays: allow lights and greenery, have a time limit, avoid religious
decorations in common areas).
193. "Generally, to avoid being involved in arbitrarily deciding which displays are appropriate
and which are not, many boards have decided to ban any individual displays observable from outside
the building." Jay Romano, Your Home: Why Some Americans Can't Fly the Flag, N.Y. TIMES,
June 11, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 9971582 (quoting Arthur L. Weinstein, an attorney and
vice president of the Council of New York Cooperatives and Condominiums). Weinstein noted
further that "the issue typically arises over displaying Nativity scenes, menorahs and other religious
symbols...." Id.
194. Religious housing that is exempt from the FHA (housing operated or controlled by religious
organizations) would of course be free to have such symbols, but the exemption is narrow. See, e.g.,
United States v. Columbus Country Club, 915 F.2d 877 (3rd Cir. 1990); see also Taormina
Theosophical Comty, Inc. v. Silver, 140 Cal. App. 3d 964 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (court refuses to

98

[Vol. 38: 57, 2010]

Religion-FreeEnvironments
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

could be unlawful'95 fails to consider the different levels of expectation on
different types of property and illustrates the chilling effect of the
endorsement approach. 196
The FHA has sometimes helped to stem the tide of religion-free
environments,197 but only where particular religious denominations have
been singled out.'98 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently

enforce subdivision covenant that restricted residence to members of religious group).
195. In the apartment building context, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
says secularized holiday symbols in common areas do not violate the FHA. See Steven J. Edelstein,
Fair Housing v. The Easter Bunny: If Decoratingfor the Holiday Season Caused You Legal
Conflict, This Year Don't Let FairHousing Violations Rain on Your Easter Parade,UNITS, Apr. 1,
2006, at 34. Indeed, in the CIC context, one sees examples of owners associations making decisions
based on Supreme Court Establishment Clause precedent in the public-religious-display contextallowing a menorah on the assumption that it is not religious, but prohibiting a cr6che on the
assumption that it is religious. See, e.g., Adam Lisberg, Her Holiday Wish Trumped, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS, Dec. 13, 2005, at 22, available at 2005 WLNR 25302899; Rae, supra note 57. But, that
categorization is not an accurate reflection of the case law, even if it were applicable. See Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984); Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
196. In contrast to exclusive use property and common property to which residents have access for
assembly purposes, CIC property that identifies the community-such as the landscaped entrancecarries very little expectation for resident religious exercise. However, an owners association is free
to erect temporary displays for major religious holidays. Such displays should be representative and
inclusive. See, e.g., Siegler, supra note 54, at 3; Ann Givens, Hanukkah Bows Go Up at Gate on
Court's Order: A Jewish Couple Persuaded a Judge to Overrule their New Smyrna Beach
Homeowners Association's Resistance, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Dec. 22, 2000, at Al, available at
2000 WLNR 8640561 (court required addition of blue and white bows to subdivision entrance where
red bows, wreaths, and Christmas tree banner had been placed); Stan V. Jezierski, Holiday
Decorations and the Fair Housing Act, COLORADO HOME OWNERS ASS'N L. (Dec. 2, 2008),
http://www.cohoalaw.com/governance-holiday-decorations-and-the-fair-housing-act.html ("[I]f the
association's membership demands to exhibit religious symbols . .. they can be displayed.
However, the association should take extra care to give equal treatment [to other faiths]."); see also
Angie Francalancia, Holiday' Display Prompts Fightfor Menorah, PALM BEACH POST, Dec. 10,
1993, at IC, available at 1993 WLNR 1377012 (white lights at gatehouse represent Christmas to
Jewish residents who want menorah displayed); cf Janice De Jesus, Religious Leaders Help
Rossmoor Residents with Creche; Meeting Opens Up Discussionof What Type of Holiday Symbols,
If Any, Should Be Allowed at the Retirement Community, CONTRA COSTA TIMES (Walnut Creek,
CA), Dec. 11, 2003 at 5, available at 2003 WLNR 9505989 (reporting that many CICs do not allow
religious symbols at entrance, describing concerns especially if only one religion represented).
197. The Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice has been active in investigating
condominium associations and landlords for what it has viewed as discriminatory restrictions to
make sure residents can use common rooms for religious purposes and display religious statues and
mezuzahs. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 17; see also Michael P. Seng, The Fair
HousingAct and Religious Freedom, 11 TEX J. C.L. & C.R. 1, 7-8 (2005).
198. Section 3604(a) of the FHA prohibits discrimination in the sale or rental of a dwelling
because of race, color, national origin, religion, sex, handicap, or familial status. 42 U.S.C. §
3604(a) (2006). Obviously, refusal to sell or rent property to a person because of his or her religion
would violate this provision of the statute. See id.
More directly relevant to the context of CIC covenants, FHA section 3604(b) also prohibits
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held in Bloch v. Frischholz that an aggressively enforced CIC prohibition of
a mezuzah on a condominium resident's doorframe presented genuine issues
for trial on intentional discrimination under the FHA.' 99 The owners
association had reinterpreted a rule (originally prohibiting items cluttering
common hallways) to prohibit placement of any item, including a mezuzah
(with dimensions of six inches long, one inch wide, and one inch deep).2 00
Issues for trial existed because the rule as reinterpreted was a marked
departure from prior practice and because of a record replete with antiSemitic conduct on the part of the CIC's leadership. 20' Because the rule was

discrimination "in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the
provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex,
familial status, or national origin." Id. § 3604(b). When CICs restrict access to or use of common
areas, for instance, such restriction can be challenged as unlawful discrimination "in the provision of
services or facilities." See id.; see, e.g., Savanna Club Worship Serv., Inc. v. Savanna Club
Homeowners' Ass'n, 456 F. Supp. 2d 1223 (S.D. Fla. 2005) (ban on religious services in common
room does not violate FHA because it does not single out any one religious group). The Savanna
Club court rejected the notion set forth in Halprin v. PrairieSingle Family Homes ofDearborn Park
Ass'n., 388 F.3d 327 (7th Cir. 2004), that the FHA was limited to acquisition (not post-acquisition)
discrimination. The Savanna Club court wrote, "[p]art and parcel of the purchase of a home within a
planned community are the rights and privileges associated with membership within the
community... . In the context of planned communities, where association members have rights to
use designated common areas as an incident of their ownership, discriminatory conduct which
deprives them of exercising those rights would be actionable under the FHA." Id. at 1230. For
commentary critical of Halprin, see generally Oliveri, supra note 37.
Halprin'snarrow reading was rejected by the Seventh Circuit en banc in Bloch v. Frischholz,
587 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 2009), which found that "in some circumstances homeowners have an FHA
cause of action for discrimination that occurred after they moved in." Id. at 772. The Blochs'
placement of a mezuzah on their doorpost was repeatedly removed by the condominium association,
and the Blochs sued under the FHA. Id. at 773. The court reasoned that the Blochs' agreement to be
governed by the condominium association was a "term or condition" of sale (because the agreement
was made at the time of purchase) that brought the case within section 3604(b); the association's
power to restrict the unit owners' rights flows from the terms of sale. Id. at 780. Thus, the Blochs
could allege post-acquisition discrimination when the association restricted rights in a discriminatory
manner. Id.
199. Bloch v. Frischolz, 533 F.3d 562 (7th Cir. 2008), vacated by Bloch v. Frischholz, 587 F.3d
771 (7th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (reversing district court's grant of summary judgment to condominium
association).
200. Bloch, 587 F.3d at 772.
201. Id. After the hallways were repainted and the rule reinterpreted to prohibit any item on the
door frame, for over a year association staff "repeatedly confiscated" each successive mezuzah the
Blochs placed on their door; the facts alleged anti-Semitic actions by the board president as well. Id.
at 773-74. But the panel of the Seventh Circuit (whose decision was vacated) focused not on these
alleged facts but on the general applicability and facial neutrality of the hallway rule. Bloch, 533
F.3d at 564 ("Generally applicable rules that do not refer to religion differ from discrimination.").
Note that generally applicable, facially neutral laws are constitutional under the Free Exercise Clause
of the First Amendment, regardless of the impairment or prohibition of religious practice. See
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).). The Bloch panel viewed the Blochs' complaint
as a request for an exemption from an otherwise general, neutral rule; the court refused it, since the
FHA has no provision for religious accommodation. Bloch, 533 F.3d at 565. The dissent of Judge
Diane Wood provided a much better articulation of the situation because it recognized the strong
allegations of discrimination. See id. at 566 (Wood, J., dissenting).
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general and neutral (at least facially), the court made clear that under the
FHA, the Blochs must show that the reinterpretation was made 'because of
and not merely 'in spite of their religion. In other words, the evidence must
indicate that the Association was not simply indifferent when it reinterpreted
the Hallway Rules; the evidence must show that the Association
reinterpreted the Rules with Jews in mind." 202 They must prove that the
restrictions, "though neutral in their terms, through their design,
construction, or enforcement target the practices of a particular religion for
discriminatory treatment." 203 It is not enough to show an "adverse impact"
resulting from the application of a general rule.20 In reaction to Bloch and
similar cases, Illinois and Florida have enacted legislation protecting
religious symbols like mezuzahs.205

202. Bloch, 587 F.3d at 785 (quoting in part and citing Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.
City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)). Even despite Smith's focus on form and not effect, Lukumi
made clear that a general rule might still be discriminatory. Discrimination under Lukumi includes
"laws which, though neutral in their terms, through their design, construction, or enforcement target
the practices of a particular religion for discriminatory treatment." Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 557 (Scalia,
J., concurring). The Seventh Circuit, in its en banc opinion, noted that "the hallway rule might have
been neutral when adopted ... but the Blochs' principal argument is that the Rule isn't neutral
anymore." Bloch, 587 F.3d at 783. The Court thus placed the burden on the Blochs to prove that
condominium association's reinterpretation of the rule was the product of anti-religious
discrimination-that the reinterpretation singled out Jews for discriminatory treatment. Id.
Although the decision relies on some of the reasoning of Judge Wood's dissent in the vacated
decision, it sets an unnecessarily high bar to meeting the Lukumi standard. See id.
203. Bloch, 587 F.3d at 785-86 (quoting Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 557 (Scalia, J., concurring)).
204. Id. at 785. The court notes that this requirement is driven by Employment Division v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872 (1990), because "[u]nder Smith, the denial of a religious exception is not intentional
discrimination." Bloch, 587 F3d at 785. The Free Exercise Clause protects against anti-religious
discrimination, but not against burdens to religious practice that result from general, neutral rules.
See id. at 785-86.
205. In response to the facts of Bloch, Chicago enacted an ordinance prohibiting landlords and
condominium associations "from placing or affixing a religious sign, symbol or relic on the door,
door post or entrance of an individual apartment, condominium or cooperative housing unit" unless
necessary to "avoid substantial damage to the property or an undue hardship to other unit owners."
Chi., Ill., Mun. Code § 5-8-030(H) (2008). Then Illinois amended its condominium law. See Ill.
Stat. Sec. 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 605/18.4(h) (West 2008) (concerning the adoption and amendment
of rules regarding operation and use of property) ("[N]o rule or regulation may impair any rights
guaranteed by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States or Section 4 of Article I
of the Illinois Constitution including, but not limited to, the free exercise of religion, nor may any
rules or regulations conflict with the provisions of this Act or the condominium instruments. No rule
or regulation shall prohibit any reasonable accommodation for religious practices, including the
attachment of religiously mandated objects to the front-door area of a condominium unit."). Id.
In response to a similar mezuzah ban in a Florida condominium, Florida enacted a law that
provides: "An association may not refuse the request of a unit owner for a reasonable
accommodation for the attachment on the mantel or frame of the door of the unit owner of a
religious object not to exceed 3 inches wide, 6 inches high, and 1.5 inches deep." FLA. STAT. ANN.
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Others have used state versions of the FHA to challenge CIC
restrictions. New York's Attorney General Andrew Cuomo used the state's
Human Rights Law successfully in 2009 to end a mezuzah ban; 206 Arizona's
Attorney General Terry Goddard used the Arizona Fair Housing Act
successfully in 2006 to ensure that Mormons could use a community room
for a weekly meeting; 207 and in Connecticut, the Commission on Human
Rights and Opportunities won a settlement in 2005 for an Orthodox Jewish
couple to permit the display of their succah on their balcony during
Succoth.208 But the facts at issue in these situations, like the facts of Bloch,
were replete with anti-denominational harassment that easily demonstrated
intentional discrimination falling within the statutory proscription. In cases
that lack this record of anti-denominational animus, the FHA claim has not
been successful. Courts have typically not considered CIC enforcement of
generally applicable restrictions to be discriminatory; 209 even facially
discriminatory restrictions that proscribe only religious conduct have
survived FHA challenge.2 10
Returning to the larger concern regarding the possible application of
constitutional norms to the CIC context, one might wonder whether the
norms of the Free Exercise Clause would protect religious residents in those
cases where the FHA does not. Free exercise norms, like the FHA, protect
residents only against hostile restrictions enacted or enforced because ofnot in spite of-religion.2 11 Under a broad reading of the clause, free
§ 718.113 (West 2009) (Title 40, Real and Personal Property, Chapter 718 Condominiums, Part 1
General Provisions. Subpart (6)). See Joe Kollin, Condo Bans Religious Symbol on Doorposts,
supra note 54, at IB. Texas is considering similar legislation. See MacLaggan, supra note 54;
Wertheimer, supra note 54.
206. See OFF. ATT'Y GEN., supra note 54 ; see also Jones, supra note 54, at A05.
207. See Press Release, Off. Att'y Gen. Terry Goddard, supra note 57; Editorial, AG Answers
Group'sPrayers,supranote 57.
208. Couple Settle Religion DiscriminationCasefor $27,000, supra note 55.
209. See Tien Tao Ass'n. v. Kingsbridge Park Cmty. Ass'n, 953 S.W.2d 525 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997)
(affirming enforcement of residential-only covenant against church did not violate FHA); Boodram
v. Md. Farms Condo., No. 93-1320, 1994 WL 31025 (4th Cir. Feb. 1, 1994). In Boodram, a Hindu
owner placed a religious symbol (jhandee) on the balcony in violation of a prohibition on balcony
storage. Boodram, No. 93-1320, 1994 WL 31025, at *1. The court found the prohibition "an
altogether typical and reasonable attempt by a condominium association to ensure an attractive and
uniform appearance." Id. at *2. The very requirement of "discrimination" renders the FHA the
wrong vehicle for addressing general, religion-neutral servitudes that create religion-free
environments.
210. See Savanna Club Worship Serv., Inc. v. Savanna Club Homeowners' Ass'n, 456 F. Supp. 2d
1223 (S.D. Fla. 2005) (holding that a ban on religious services does not violate FHA because it does
not single out any one religious group).
211. See supra notes 201-204 and accompanying text. Interpreting "discrimination" under the
FHA looks to the meaning of discrimination under the Free Exercise Clause. See, e.g., Bloch v.
Frischholz, 587 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 2009) (en banc). While the clause does not apply directly to
private actors, case law can offer guidance on whether a restriction is neutral or discriminatory. See
LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 67 F.3d 412, 426 (2d Cir. 1995).
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exercise norms would help to ensure equal access to common areas as
between religious and non-religious uses,2 12 but they would offer no
protection from neutral, generally applicable restrictions which are the most
prevalent form of CIC restriction.213 Since free exercise norms are currently

interpreted narrowly," they do not appear to provide a counterweight to the
pressure from establishment norms to create a religion-free visual
environment. In sum, the best way to break free from the consent model at
one end and the constitutional norms model at the other is to employ
traditional property doctrines for rendering restrictions on land use
unenforceable.
B.

The TraditionalPropertyArgument: Servitudes Cannot Violate Public
Policy

Religion-free environments undermine the common good of civil
society because the flourishing of the human person requires both
neighborhood stability and religious freedom. Framing the concern in
societal terms is not an exaggeration-if servitudes that yield religion-free
environments become the standard norm for CIC governing documents,
millions of Americans will live in religion-free private communities. 215 In
this way, private law would construct a social world that severely
compromises a basic overarching social and constitutional principle: that
religious freedom is the presumptive position on private property. But
courts are not powerless to change this, even if other CIC restrictions have
been deemed part of the bargain. The judicial power to invalidate covenants

212. This is the current DOJ interpretation. See supranote 9.
213. Such CIC restrictions run no risk of an investigation by the Civil Rights Division. See supra
notes 9, 72, 197.
214. The scope of the Free Exercise Clause, like the scope of the FHA, is limited to situations of
discrimination. See supra note 204.
215. CC&Rs can become standardized, so that restrictions used in some CICs can spread quickly
through the declarations and governing documents of others. See supra note 40 and accompanying
text. The argument that the market will facilitate the creation of alternative "religion-friendly" CICs
is unrealistic. Developers are conservative, adopting restrictions (especially religion-neutral ones)
that appear in documents of other CICs. Furthermore, this notion of the market providing different
kinds of housing for different tastes misunderstands religious land use as a unique feature of
residential life that has to be bargained for, rather than a fundamental, universally recognized aspect
of residential life. But cf Jo Anne P. Stubblefield, Summary of Secondary Mortgage Market
Requirementsfor PUDS, in DRAFTING (AND RE-DRAFTING) DOCUMENTS FOR CONDOMINIUMS AND
PLANNED

COMMUNITIES

IN TROUBLED

TIMES:

PRACTICE AND

PRINCIPLES,

A.L.I.-A.B.A.

CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. (2008) (recognizing an owner's right to display religious symbols
subject to time, place and manner restrictions, but the extent of the right is unclear).
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that violate public policy becomes the vehicle for remaking the social world
into one in which responsible religious exercise is protected, for it is this
doctrine that encourages courts to scrutinize the effects of religious exercise
in CICs and of servitudes that suppress it. 2 16
What are the sources of public policy to protect religion, even when it is
not targeted in a way actionable under the FHA? Of course, the argument
relies heavily on the overarching constitutional design that locates vibrant,
theologically significant religious exercise primarily on private property.
But beyond this, the federal RLUIPA, which on its face is applicable only to
state actors that make land use decisions, is relevant. 217 The argument is not
that RLUIPA should apply to private land use decisions. The argument is
instead that courts can distill basic policy from the statute to determine
whether and how it should be applied in the private CIC context. The statute
provides for the protection of religious land use absent a compelling
governmental interest, even if that means an exemption from a general,
religion-neutral rule. 218 It also requires non-discriminatory treatment under
land use laws to prevent religious land uses from being treated differently
from comparable non-religious land uses. 219 Finally, it prohibits the
exclusion or unreasonable limitation of religious uses. 220 The policy
expressed in the first provision is that religious land use that does not harm
neighbors should be allowed-prohibitions are justified when its negative
impacts cannot be mitigated or eliminated. 22 1 The policy expressed in the
second is that religious land use should not be excluded from areas where

216. For a discussion of public policy (rather than state action) as a way to protect constitutional
rights, see Saxer, supra note 158, at 103-09.
217. The sources of public policy include not only constitutions and court decisions, but
legislation as well. The Restatement notes that "[c]ourts may apply the policies manifested by
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:
legislation more broadly than the legislation provides."
SERVITUDES § 3.1 cmt. f(2000) (sources of public policy); see also Saxer, supra note 158, at 103.
218. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1) (2006) ("No government shall impose or implement a land use
regulation in a manner that imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person,
including a religious assembly or institution unless the government demonstrates that imposition of
the burden on that person, assembly, or institution-(A) is in furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest; and (B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest."). More than half the states, which require strict scrutiny review of burden on
free exercise by statute or constitutional interpretation, would also have such a public policy. See
supra note 92.
219. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1)-(2) (2006) ("(1) No government shall impose or implement a land
use regulation in a manner that treats a religious assembly or institution on less than equal terms with
a nonreligious assembly or institution. (2) No government shall impose or implement a land use
regulation that discriminates against any assembly or institution on the basis of religion or religious
denomination.").
220. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(3) (2006) ("No government shall impose or implement a land use
regulation that-(A) totally excludes religious assemblies from a jurisdiction or (B) unreasonably
limits religious assemblies, institutions, or structures within a jurisdiction.").
221. Carmella, RLUIPA, supranote 14, at 525-35.

104

Religion-FreeEnvironments

[Vol. 38: 57, 2010]

PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

similar non-religious uses are allowed.222 And the third provision, a catchall of sorts, represents a clear rejection of a religion-free environment. 223
Applying these policies to the CIC context would yield protections for
responsible religious exercise. Neutral, general restrictions resulting in the
prohibition of religious uses or symbols would be justified only if they were
necessary to prevent identifiable harms to neighbors.224 Restrictions that
target only religious uses or displays would be unenforceable. 225 As a matter
of public policy, then, we see that religious exercise must be treated at least
as well as comparable activity, and that even beyond that, religious exercise
under certain circumstances must be given even greater protection. These
legal and societal norms serve as the backdrop to the Restatement balancing
set forth below.
On a showing that religion-free environments violate public policy,
courts will invalidate the restrictions that produce and sustain them to the
extent those restrictions are applied to religious expression and
226
t
Under the Restatement, servitudes that violate public policy
association.
include any CIC restrictions that "unreasonably burden a fundamental
constitutional right." 2 27 However, the Restatement does not simply import
constitutional law-indeed, it asserts that the analysis is "a matter of
property law, not of constitutional law." 228 Significantly, although
222. Id. at 519-24.
223. See 42 U.S.C. §2000cc(b)(3) (2006).
224. See infra note 233 and accompanying text.
225. The Free Exercise interpretation in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye Inc. v. City of Hialeah,
508 U.S. 520 (1993) should lead courts to the same interpretation, but in Bloch v. Frischolz, 533
F.3d 562 (7th Cir. 2008), vacated by, Bloch v. Frischholz, 587 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 2009) (en banc)
and Savanna Club Worship Serv. v. Savanna Club Homeowners' Ass'n, 456 F. Supp. 2d 1223 (S.D.
Fla. 2005) Lukumi has been limited to its facts and understood to protect only a particular religious
denomination. See Bloch, 533 F.3d at 564-65. The DOJ, on the other hand, has adopted a broader
interpretation. See supra note 9.
226. As noted in supra note 39, restrictions creating religion-free environments include both
servitudes established in the declaration as well as rules later enacted by the owners association (or
by vote of the owners). While "[s]ervitudes included in the declaration are valid unless illegal,
unconstitutional, or against public policy .... [r]ules are not valid unless they are also reasonable."
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES

§

6.7 cmt. b (2000).

Because the public policy

argument here applies to all such restrictions, whether servitudes or rules, no separate analysis for
the unreasonableness of rules has been undertaken.
227. Id. § 3.1. The Restatement notes that a violation of public policy occurs when covenants (1)
are arbitrary, spiteful or capricious; (2) unreasonably burden a fundamental constitutional right; (3)
impose an unreasonable restraint on alienation; (4) impose an unreasonable restraint on trade or
competition; or (5) are unconscionable. Id. Courts will invalidate restrictions that "inhibit[] the
exercise of rights that are important to the public good" when their enforcement would result in
public harm. Id. at cmt. h.
228. Id. § 3.1 cmt. h; see also Comm. for a Better v. Twin Rivers Homeowners' Ass'n, 929 A.2d
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constructive notice of restrictions is relevant, it is not the end of the
inquiry.229 This allows courts to engage in the normative task of deciding
whether and in what circumstances restraints on religious exercise in a
community are permissible--essentially a decision about which terms of the
CIC contract should be enforceable and which ones should not.
As a matter of property law, the public policy analysis involves a
balancing of the interests of those burdened by the restriction against the
interests of the beneficiaries of the restriction, a task which is "necessarily
imprecise."230 In general, the Restatement notes that courts consider
whether the risks of harm to society from enforcement outweigh the benefits
of enforcement.231 Judges evaluate the covenant's impact, identify public
interests negatively affected by enforcement, and weigh those harms against
the interest in enforcement. They also query whether validating the
servitude will encourage wider adoption of similar servitudes and greater
harm.232 When CIC restrictions affect fundamental rights like religious
exercise, the beneficiaries' interest in enforcement is circumscribed:
[T]he legitimate interest of the landowners in controlling activities
of other landowners are generally limited to controlling use of
common areas and controlling activities that create external effects
in the neighborhood. Use of servitudes to control activity involving
1060, 1071-72 (N.J. 2007) (claiming that a public policy analysis protects CIC residents from
unreasonable restriction in the exercise of fundamental rights under the state constitution and that
such an unreasonable restriction violates public policy and is unenforceable). CIC residents "are
protected under traditional principles of property law-principles that specifically account for the
rights afforded under our constitution's free speech and association clauses." Id. at 1075. In regards
to religion-free environments, the important constitutional norm here is not simply religious
freedom, but the general, overarching constitutional design that places religious exercise on private
property. Thus, in this author's view, it is more accurate to frame the issue as whether the servitudes
that support the religion-free environment burden the constitutional right to use one's private
property as the location for responsible religious exercise.
229. The greater the notice to the burdened party, the stronger the beneficiary's claim that the
restriction should be enforced; if the restriction is buried in a document or, in cases where "an
ordinary purchaser would not necessarily understand that it would apply to the situation in question,"
less weight is given to the beneficiary's claim. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.1
cmt. h (2000).
230. Id. § 3.1 cmt. i; see also Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condo. Ass'n, 878 P.2d 1275 (Cal.
1994) (noting that a covenant is not enforceable when harm caused is disproportionate to the benefit
produced by its enforcement).
231. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.1 cmt. h (2000).
232. Id. § 3.1 cmt. i. The focus on the covenant's impact is a traditional consideration of the
common law. Indeed, one of the factors courts use to assess the reasonableness of a covenant is
"[w]hether the covenant interferes with the public interest." Twin Rivers, 929 A.2d at 1076; see,
e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, Dilemmas of Group Autonomy: Residential Associations and
Community, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 12-17 (1989) (defending reasonableness review because it
"requires the rules of the group to conform not only to the association's own internal values but to
external values as well-i.e., values that, in the court's judgment, are widely shared throughout the
rest of the polity." Id. at 6).
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the exercise of fundamental rights on individually owned property is
generally not legitimate unless the activity produces spill-over
effects that have an adverse impact on other property owners in the

[CIC]. 233
Neighbors who want a religion-free environment-and who are the
beneficiaries of servitudes that create it-must show how the placement of
religious symbols on individually owned or exclusively used property2 34
causes "spill-over effects that have an adverse impact on them." 235 Their
reasons for wanting to prohibit symbols might be primarily aesthetic-that
is, that some public manifestations of religion are ugly or messy and result in
lower property values. Or their reasons might be primarily social or
psychological-perhaps that public displays of religion are offensive,
divisive, or annoying. Minorities might feel threatened by the symbols of a
visible majority. Even co-religionists might feel threatened by symbols of a
highly visible minority.23 6 Others might feel strongly on principle that
religion is so intensely private that it should be practiced only inside the
home and inside a house of worship.237 A central question, then, is whether
these harms should be considered legitimate, and if legitimate, whether they
outweigh the interests of other residents in religious freedom.
For those burdened by the restrictions, publicly visible religious exercise
is restrained-but for the servitude, they would still be able to practice their
religion. Given the likelihood that such restrictions, when upheld, become
standardized and more widely used, these restrictions implicate not just
religious freedom for the residents, but the broader religious freedom and
common good of civil society. As an additional public harm, these
233. RESTATEMENT, supra note 39, § 3.1 cmt. h (emphasis added).
234. This article continues to interpret common areas to mean physical spaces to which all
residents have access, and not those elements to which residents are given rights to exclusive use,
even though such elements may be owned or managed by the CIC. See supra note 32 and
accompanying text.
235. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 39, § 3.1 cmt. h; supranote 233 and accompanying text.
236. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 57; Orthodox Jews Sue Condo Over Prayer Ban, supra note
57.
237. As one commentator noted:
Many people never exercise some of the rights they possess, and do not value living in a
community in which others exercise these rights. Others, although valuing certain basic
rights, would nevertheless prefer on balance to live in a community in which no one
exercises those rights. For both sorts of people, freedom from others exercising the rights
... may seem necessary for activities or communities they do value. ... It is only
because they perceive conformity by their neighbors as necessary to maintaining a
desirable community that people turn to a legal device such as the residential covenant.
Note, supra note 64, at 484.
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restrictions render large areas of private property-the constitutionally
designated domain of religious expression-off-limits to the public
manifestation of that expression. Courts will weigh the harm to residents
whose religious expression and association is restricted (and the more
general harm to society) against the residents' interest in enforcement. The
normative approach to this balancing has been described earlier, in Section
III, which is informed by Catholic social thought and basic property law
concepts.238
Consider also the specific guidance of the Restatement itself, which is
remarkably consistent with the normative approach discussed earlier. The
Restatement provides illustrations concerning the application of restrictions
ranging from a CIC prohibition of signs and banners visible from the street
to political yard signs and American flag displays.239 While such a
prohibition maintains aesthetic uniformity, the Restatement concludes that
the harm to the public interest (participation in political debate through the
yard sign and symbolic expression via the flag) outweighs the interest in
validating the covenant. In both cases, alternative means of expression are
not available, and "adverse impacts on other subdivision lot owners are not
likely to be substantial."240 In some cases, however, the balancing might
favor aesthetic interests over expressive freedom. For instance, if the sign or
flag were unusually large, the court would more likely enforce the covenant
because a smaller sign or flag would constitute a reasonable, alternative
means of expression. 241 Furthermore, the large size could have "spill-over
effects that could affect the aesthetics of the neighborhood and the use and
enjoyment of adjacent properties."242 Note, however, that the interest in not
seeing your neighbor's political expression is not given any weight in the
analysis. 243 The Restatement approach, like the Declaration's approach to
responsible religious exercise, favors expressive freedom while restricting

238. See, e.g., supra Part III.
239. RESTATEMENT, supra note 39, § 3.1 cmt. h, illus. 7, 8; see also Comm. for a Better v. Twin
Rivers Homeowners' Ass'n, 929 A.2d 1060, 1075-76 (N.J. 2007); federal Freedom to Display the
American Flag Act of 2005 §3, 4 U.S.C. § 5 (2006) (discussed supra note 10).
240. RESTATEMENT, supranote 39, § 3.1 cmt. h, illus. 8.
241. Id. § 3.1 cmt.h, illus. 9.
242. Id. This analysis suggests that the economic harm suffered by aesthetic disruption is more
appropriately restricted than psychological harm suffered by one who considers political speech to
be inappropriate or offensive. "Although [restrictions that do not necessarily increase the value of
the benefited property] are no longer categorically invalid, strong justification is required for a
servitude that burdens fundamental rights of successive landowners for a purpose unrelated to the
use or value of the beneficiary's land." Id. § 3.1 cmt. h.
243. Indeed, in Twin Rivers, the fact that public political speech, though limited, was not
completely banned was critical to upholding the actions of the owners association. Twin Rivers, 929
A.2d at 1073-74. Political signs were permitted within flower beds adjacent to homes and in
windows. Id.
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identifiable negative impacts on surrounding properties.24 Reasonable
regulations (e.g., size limits) are sufficient to protect the legitimate interests
of neighbors, but neighbors do not have the right to expect a social world
devoid of political signs or American flags.
Courts should refuse enforcement of CIC restrictions that create and
sustain religion-free environments on public policy grounds. In this way,
courts would construct a social world open to responsible expression of
religious identity. Considering the public policy that protects responsible
religious exercise on private property, courts would be justified in finding
that public expression, rather than suppression, of religious symbols and
uses better promotes the dignity of the person and the common good of
society.
V.

CONCLUSION

When CICs exclude religious association and expression from the
publicly visible areas, they do so on the assumption that they are protecting
property values by enforcing aesthetic and social uniformity. But they
should consider other values that are violated by religion-free environments:
the dignity of the person, the common good of society, and the fundamental
expectations that attach to private property. Because a religion-free
environment denies responsible religious freedom to residents and impedes
the creation of authentic neighborhoods, this article has argued that courts
should refuse to enforce the restrictions that yield such an environment.
This type of state intervention is fully consistent with the principle of
subsidiarity, which generally allows freedom to intermediary, non-state
actors in civil society but justifies intervention when those actors thwart the
common good. In this author's view, the use of traditional property
doctrines-the unenforceability of servitudes that violate public policy-is
the appropriate vehicle to challenge these restrictive environments, because
statutory norms of non-discrimination are insufficient to address them and
constitutional norms would actually require them.
The normative argument calls for a particular construction of social life
in CICs as it relates to property and religion: one in which residents can
express their religious identity in symbolism and practice where they live,
much like we allow people to express their religious identity in the way they
dress. Unlike France, we do not ban public wearing of religious garb.
Neither should the law permit the restriction of public expression of

244.

See supra Part II.B.
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religious identity on private property. Expression, rather than suppression,
coincides with the nature of the human person and the nature of community.
While religious expression should be subject to regulation in order to
mitigate negative impacts on neighbors, it should not be flatly prohibited-a
world in which religious freedom flourishes on private property is a better
world indeed.
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